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THESES
1. One of the key objectives of Russian energy strategy has been, and still re-
mains, to strengthen the country’s position on the international energy 
markets, especially among exporters of oil and oil products. Despite the 
need to diversify the economy, as declared by the Russian government, oil 
exports is still a fundamental source of income for the state. In this context 
the EU market is of vital importance, as − despite the rise in Russian exports 
to Asian countries – it remains the most important outlet for Russian oil 
companies, and as such yields the biggest profits from sales of oil and oil 
products.
2. In the period 2011-14, a consistent drop in Russian crude oil supplies to the 
EU could be observed, of about 15.6%, both via sea and land routes (the ‘Dru-
zhba’ pipeline). At the same time, exports of oil-derived products produced 
by Russian refineries have risen. These processes are, on the one hand, de-
termined by the situation on the EU market: a decline in demand for oil 
associated with the economic downturn, and a reduction in refinery output 
(and the closure of refineries in Europe), among other factors. On the other 
hand, they are a reflection of trends visible in Russia itself, primarily an 
increase in output in Russian refineries.
3. The period 2011-14 saw a significant strengthening in the dominant position 
of the state oil company Rosneft, which as a result of the acquisition of the 
company TNK-BP has become the leading Russian supplier to the EU market, 
of both crude oil and oil products. Its status has also been boosted by di-
rect contracts to supply Russian oil to German, Polish and Czech customers, 
and by investments in assets (in particular, refinery assets in Germany and 
Italy). Apart from Rosneft, only Lukoil has become actively involved in the 
EU market, although most recently we have observed its withdrawal from 
the oil sector in Central Europe.
4. At present it is difficult to say that there is any coherent Russian oil strategy 
regarding the European Union. The current shape of Russian activity in 
the EU (the export targets of crude oil and oil products; the investments in 
assets) is more the chance result of individual companies’ business, rather 
than the effect of activities coordinated by the state (on the model of the gas 
sector). This does not mean, however, that the state cannot influence the oil 
companies’ strategies. One illustration of this is the tariff (export duties) 
and fiscal policy, which affects the profitability of exports of crude oil and 
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oil products; or the activities concerning the logistics of Russian exports 
(the visible increase in the use of maritime routes to export crude oil; the 
increased use of Russian ports to export oil products, at the expense of ports 
in the Baltic states).
5. The long-term prospects (10-20 years) for the Russian position on the EU 
market are pessimistic. It is true that factors such as unfavourable produc-
tion forecasts within the EU itself (regarding both crude oil and oil products) 
and the adaptation of many European refineries to process Russian Urals 
oil are advantageous for Russia. However, the significance of the negative 
factors is increasing. These include the overall decline in oil consumption 
in the EU, the observed increase in competition among exporters of oil (Af-
rica, mainly Nigeria and Angola; and in the long term, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
and possibly also the USA) and oil products (India, China, the USA) on the 
EU market, and the deterioration in Russian/EU cooperation in the context 
of the anti-Russian sanctions. Domestic factors − in particular the unclear 
prospects for the upstream sector, including the risk of a significant decline 
in oil production over the next decade; or the long-term effects of the fiscal 
changes being introduced in Russia − may also be of considerable impor-
tance for Russian oil activity in the EU.
6. If the negative trend in crude oil exports to the EU in the short term (up to 
2020) can be halted, then in the medium and long term (after 2020, espe-
cially in the period 2030-40) the importance of European exports will prob-
ably decrease more dynamically than Russian forecasts assume. Thus if total 
Russian oil exports decline in the long term, the importance of the Asian 
market will rise.
It is also possible that in the long term (2030-40), the share of Asian markets 
in the total export of Russian oil will be comparable to the importance of 
the EU countries’ export markets, although this would require a significant, 
quantitative increase in Russian exports to Asia. On the one hand, the very 
optimistic long-term forecasts for growth in oil consumption in Asia (espe-
cially in China) suggest this will be a favourable scenario. On the other hand, 
however, there are serious doubts about the prospects of significant rises of 
oil production in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. In turn, the transmission 
of oil from Western Siberia (which in the long term will remain Russia’s main 
production centre) towards the East would require a large investment in ex-
panding the pipeline infrastructure; this might also prove unprofitable, tak-
ing into consideration the costs of transmission. Moreover, the intensifying 
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competition among exporters on Asian markets will be a factor operating to 
Russia’s detriment.
However, it should be noted that the inevitable decline of the importance of 
the EU market and the ability to further boost the role of Asia in Russian oil 
exports will be the result not so much of political decisions (though the stra-
tegic pivot to the East announced by President Putin has some significance 
in that regard) as primarily a consequence of economic necessity.
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INTRODUCTION
The oil sector is of strategic importance for the stable functioning of the Russian 
state1. It plays a key role both in the context of tax revenues to the state budget 
(41.8%), and in Russian exports in general (53.8%)2. The export of crude oil and 
oil-derived products is also one of the key dimensions of Russian energy policy. 
In official Russian documents, primarily the energy strategies adopted by the 
government of the Russian Federation3, one of the major declared strategic ob-
jectives is to strengthen Russia’s position on the international market for oil and 
gas exporters. The implementation of this objective was intended, on the one 
hand, to facilitate the recovery of the global oil market which began in the first 
decade of this century; and on the other, to bring about a dynamic increase in oil 
production in the Russian Federation (annual production rose from 323.2 mil-
lion tonnes in 2000 to 533 million tonnes in 2015)4. Russian oil exports rose es-
pecially dynamically in the period 2000-04, from 145 million tonnes in 2000 to 
258 million tonnes in 2004, while remaining within the range of 243-258 million 
tonnes per annum for the next six years. In this context, the member states of 
the European Union are of particular importance, as they have for years been 
a key market for Russian energy (on average about 65% annually).
The aim of this text is to analyse the evolution of the importance of the EU 
market in the external activity of Russian oil companies (the export of crude 
oil and oil products, the investments in assets) in the period 2011-15. The choice 
of the time-frame is mainly due to the fact that after 2011, following a period of 
dynamic growth in oil exports from Russia, a declining trend became clearly 
visible.
In this publication, we attempt to indicate the major internal and external fac-
tors affecting the position of Russia on the EU market (the markets for crude oil 
1 A detailed analysis of the state of the Russian oil sector and its political and economic impor-
tance is presented in Wojciech Konończuk’s report Najlepszy sojusznik Rosji. Kondycja i pers-
pektywy rosyjskiego sektora naftowego [Russia’s best ally. The situation of the Russian oil sec-
tor and forecast for its future], CES, Warsaw 2012. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-studies/2012-04-15/russias-best-ally-situation-russian-oil-sector-and-forecast-its
2 Data for 2013 issued by the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation.
3 May 2003 saw the adoption of the Energy Strategy for Russia by 2020, and November 2009 
the Energy Strategy for Russia by 2030. Currently, work on the adoption of the Energy 
Strategy for Russia by 2035 is ongoing (the new plan for the document was announced in 
September 2015; its final adoption is planned for 2016).
4 Official figures from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation.
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and oil products, the investments in assets). In the final part, we will examine 
the prospects for the evolution of Russia’s position on the EU oil market, taking 
into account the rise in crude-oil cooperation between Russia and Asian coun-
tries, particularly with China.
The statistical data referenced in this work are essentially drawn from the pe-
riod 2011-2015 (full, annual statistics). Selected passages cite statistical data for 
the period 2000-2015, in order to reflect wider trends in Russian oil exports. 
The data used in this study is based on official communiqués published by the 
Federal Customs Service of Russia and the Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, as well as on data published by the media, including news agencies 
(Argus, Interfax) and industry periodicals (in particular Neftegazovaya vertikal 
[Нефтегазовая вертикаль]).
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I. RUSSIa’S pOSITION ON THE EU’S CRUDE OIl maRkET
1. The EU market compared to other target markets for Russian oil 
exports
Russia consistently ranks second in the world among countries export-
ing crude oil, behind only Saudi Arabia (377 million tonnes in 2013, 353 mil-
lion tonnes in 2014), but clearly ahead of countries such as Canada (135 million 
tonnes), the UAE (128 million tonnes), Iraq (121 million tonnes), Nigeria (90 mil-
lion tonnes) and Iran (56 million tonnes)5.
The member states of the EU are the main market for Russia’s crude oil. 
The largest volume of supply onto the EU market was noted in 2005-2007 
(165-173.5 million tonnes per annum). In the following years, supplies remained 
within the range of 151.5-169.3 million tonnes per annum, in 2014 reaching their 
lowest level since 2004 (142.8 million tonnes). The fall in the EU’s share of Rus-
sian oil exports is also noteworthy, from 67.1% in 2007 to 63.9% in 20146.
Table 1. The European Union’s share in Russian crude oil exports
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total exports 
(million 
tonnes)
144.4 164.5 189.5 228 260.3 252.5 248.4 258.6 243.1 247.5 250.7 244.5 240 236.6 223.4 242,9
Volume of 
exports to the
EU (in million 
tonnes)
55.8 68 83.4 110.5 126.3 165 164.9 173.5 160.9 165.5 169.3 157.1 158 151.5 142.8 154,2
The EU’s share 
in Russian oil 
exports (%)
38.6 41.3 44 48.5 48.5 65.3 66.4 67.1 66.2 66.9 67.5 64.2 65.8 64 63.9 63,5
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by the Federal Customs Service and the Observatory 
of Economic Activity; http://atlas.media.mit.edu/ru/ 
meanwhile the share of asian countries in Russian crude oil exports is 
rising steadily. Whereas in 2001 the Asian share in oil exports amounted to 
about 1.1%, by 2005 it had reached 4.5%, and by 2010 it was up to 15.3%. The 
5 Data from http://www.vlant-consult.ru/projects/world-trade/ 
6 The significant rise in the EU states’ percentage of Russian oil exports stems from the fact 
that after 2005, the figures began to include the imports of Russian oil by states which 
joined the EU on 1 May 2004, and likewise after 2007 by the EU’s enlargement to include 
Bulgaria and Romania.
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most dynamic growth, however, occurred in the period 2011-14, when exports 
to Asian countries made up almost 25% of total Russian exports (the rate of 
change in the targets of Russian oil export is illustrated in Table 2).
Table 2. The individual geographical targets of Russian crude oil export, 
totals (%)
  2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU 65.3 67.5 64.2 65.8 64 63.9 63.5
CIS 15 10.6 12.3 12 12.1 10.1 9.5
asia 4.5 15.3 12.7 17.4 21 24.2 26.4
USa 1.8 3.9 3.4 1.7 0.8 0.4 0.3
Others, including Turkey, 
morocco,
Israel, algeria, peru, 
Uruguay,
Trinidad & Tobago, Egypt)
13.4 2.7 7.4 3.1 3.1 1.4 0.3
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 
the Federal Customs Service of Russia, FSU Argus, EIA; http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.
ashx?n=pet&s=mcrim_nus-nrs_2 & f = m 
although the group of asian customers of Russian oil is expanding stead-
ily, China is of key importance among these importers.7 Total Russian 
crude oil exports to China rose in the period 2011-15 from 19.7 to 41.29 million 
tonnes, i.e. by almost 68% (via Kozmino, ESPO8 and Kazakhstan9). Supplies to 
China via the Skovorodino-Mohe oil pipeline remain stable (15 million tonnes 
in 2011, 16 million tonnes in 2015). Meanwhile, supplies to China via Kazakhstan 
7 Russian crude oil is principally exported to Asian countries via the far eastern port of 
Kozmino, the endpoint of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, and via the 
Skovorodino-Mohe oil pipeline (an offshoot of the ESPO pipeline which runs to China); de-
liveries to China are also being made via Kazakhstan through the use of swap mechanisms 
(Russian companies provide crude oil to Kazakh refineries, and Kazakhstan exports the 
appropriate amounts to China) and the Transneft pipeline system, mainly through ports 
located in the Far East.
8 The ESPO (Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean) is a Russian oil pipeline.
9 In addition to Russian ESPO oil, delivered via Asian routes, China also purchases small 
amounts of Russian Urals oil (2 million tonnes in 2014). Part of this trade is officially re-
corded as part of the transactions via the Black Sea ports; in the case of Baltic cargo, some is 
purchased in the Danish port of Skagen.
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increased significantly: 200,000 tonnes in 2011, no deliveries during the period 
2012-2013, and nearly 7 million tonnes in 2014 and 2015. Data for 2015 shows that 
China has become the leader among countries importing Russian oil via the port 
of Kozmino (exports to China 14.95 million tonnes; exports to Japan 8.7 million 
tonnes). Before 2014, Japan held first place (8.9 million tonnes in 2014), and China 
was second (5.9 million tonnes in 2014).
The increase in exports to Asian countries is due, on the one hand, to new con-
tracts concluded primarily with China (see chapter IV, section 3), but also to 
redirects towards Asia of crude oil that had previously been sent to the Ameri-
can market (the reduction in exports to the United States is linked to the shale 
revolution and the reduction in American oil imports).
Table 3. Russian crude oil exports to Asian countries (million tonnes)
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
China 19.7 24.3 24.4 33.1 41.29
Japan 8.6 10.7 14.5 14 14.8
South Korea 1.1 1.1 2.4 3.9 4
Other 1.65 5.66 8.3 3 4
Share of Asian countries
in total Russian oil exports (%) 
12.7 17.4 21 24.2 26.4
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by the FSU Argus, as well as the following sources: 
http://www.russchinatrade.ru/assets/files/ru-ru-cn-coop/ru_ch_trade_2012.pdf, http://www.ved.gov.
ru/exportcountries/cn/cn_ru_relations/cn_ru_trade/, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/11/rus-
sia-crude-japan-idUSL4N0W82XD20150311
2. Russia’s share in imports of crude oil to the EU
Russia remains a consistent leader among countries exporting oil onto the EU 
market. Russian oil makes up almost a third of total crude oil imports to the EU, 
although 2014 saw the lowest figure (28.9%) among exporters onto the EU mar-
ket since 200910. Russia exports three times more crude oil than Saudi Arabia 
(8.86% of EU imports) onto the European market, and more than twice as much 
10 In the period 2005-14 this figure fell within the range of 28.9-31.7%; at its lowest in 2009 it 
was 28.89%, at its highest in 2013 it was 31.72%. Data: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observa-
tory/oil/import_export_en.htm 
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as Norway (currently 12.63% of EU imports). At the same time, since 2012 the 
quantitative indicators of Russian oil imports onto the EU market have fallen, 
from 169.3 million tonnes in 2010 to 142.8 million tonnes in 2014, while imports 
of oil products from Russia have risen (chapter II, section 2).
Table 4. The shares of individual countries and regions in crude oil imports 
to the EU 
Country
Share of imports (%)
2011 2012 2013 2014
Russia 29.6 31.4 31.7 28.9
african countries 18.4 25.6 25.5 24.2
Europe (outside the EU) 15.1 13.6 14 15.4
middle Eastern countries 19.5 15.6 13.6 14.6
kazakhstan 6.4 5.4 5.9 6.5
North and South america 3.4 4.3 4.9 5.7
azerbaijan 4.7 3.5 4.3 4.5
Other 2.9 0.6 0.1 0.2
Oil imports to the EU, total  
(in million tonnes) 497.8 516.3 487 498.3
Author’s own calculations, based on data from the Registration of Crude Oil Imports and Deliveries in the 
European Union (EU27), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/import_export_en.htm 
Meanwhile, taking into account the shares of Russian oil in total imports in 
individual countries, the biggest proportions of supplies from Russia (accord-
ing to data from 2013) are received by member states in Central Europe: Slova-
kia (100%); Poland (96.3%), Hungary (94.1%), the Czech Republic (63.14%); and 
member states in southern Europe: Bulgaria (86.21%), Croatia (70.41%), Greece 
(48.8%), as well as Lithuania (99.25%). It is also worth mentioning that in 2014 the 
majority of EU importers of oil from Russia reduced the share of imports of Rus-
sian oil in their national totals, with Greece, the Netherlands and Belgium doing 
so to the greatest extent (detailed data in Figures 1 and 2).
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Figure 1. The importance of individual member states in the EU in Russian oil 
exports11 (in 2013)
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Figure 2. The share of Russian oil in total national oil imports in EU member 
states12 (%)
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Author’s own calculations, based on data published at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/statistics/eu-cru-
de-oil-imports 
11 In the official EU statistics involving Russian oil importers, the following EU countries do 
not appear: Cyprus, Malta, Latvia, Estonia, Ireland and Slovenia. All of the above member 
states (except Malta, which buys negligible quantities, around 100,000 tonnes per annum) 
import oil products from Russia, not crude oil itself.
12 The figure concerns import from third states (non-EU) and does not include crude oil im-
port from EU member states. 
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3. Russian oil export routes to the EU
Currently, Russian crude oil is exported to customers in EU member states by 
both sea and land. Around 68% of supplies reach the EU market via seaports; 
the Druzhba pipeline transports around 32%. Russian ports remain the main 
channel for crude oil exports to European countries, in particular Primorsk and 
Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.
The main recipients of the raw materials exported by the Russian Baltic ports 
are the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, Poland, France and Germany. 
Italy, Spain, Belgium and Denmark come further down the list. Among the ma-
jor recipients of Russian oil import, only Sweden (28%) and Italy (about 7.5%) 
have increased their deliveries, which is mainly because prices of Urals oil in 
the Baltic ports were lower than those from the Black Sea ports; the other im-
porters noted declines in 2014.
In turn, the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk exports crude oil onto the EU 
market, primarily to Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Spain; and in 
smaller quantities to France and the United Kingdom. In 2014 almost a third of 
the supplies (about 9.3 million tonnes) was accounted for by Italy (despite a drop 
of 3 million tonnes compared to 2013). In turn, only Romania noted an increase 
in the supply of Russian crude oil exported from Novorossiysk (by about 14%, 
to 6.2 million tonnes)13.
The other important export route is the Druzhba pipeline. It transmits crude 
oil to five EU member states14: Germany, Poland (which receives its oil via the so-
called Northern branch) and the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (which 
receive oil via the so-called Southern branch).
13 Data calculated on the basis of statistics published by the FSU Argus.
14 The non-EU country Bosnia and Herzegovina also imports Russian crude oil via the Druzh-
ba pipeline. Its overall share of oil imported via this route is falling steadily (from 1.11 mil-
lion tonnes in 2011, 680,000 tonnes in 2012, 790,000 tonnes in 2013 and 650,000 tonnes in 
2014; in 2015 it imported only 390,000 tonnes). Part of the oil supplied to Bosnia & Herze-
govina is supplied by Zarubiezhneft on the spot market through its own trading company 
Nestro Optima (between 40,000 and 70,000 tonnes per month in 2014).
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4. The drop in Russian crude oil supplies to the EU, and its main 
causes
In recent years, a systematic drop in exports of Russian oil onto the European 
market, both by pipeline and by sea, has become clearly visible.
The years 2011-14 saw a systematic decrease in the supplies of Russian crude 
oil exports via the Druzhba pipeline. Total deliveries to all countries along 
the pipeline’s route fell from 60.18 million tonnes in 2011 to 49.48 million tonnes 
in 2013 (for details, see Figure 3). The downward trend, though not as significant, 
continued in 2014: deliveries fell by 2.52% in comparison to 2013. In 2012, crude 
oil deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline dropped to 51.08 million tonnes (com-
pared to 60.18 million tonnes in 2011). Among the EU member states importing 
oil via Druzhba, Germany (almost 29%) and the Czech Republic (almost 30%) 
have noted the biggest declines in the period 2011-14. Nevertheless, in terms of 
volume, the leading recipients of exports via Druzhba are still Germany and 
Poland (which together receive close to 70% of supplies).
Figure 3. Crude oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline to recipient countries in 
the period 2011-14 (million tonnes)
Germany
Poland
Czech
Republic
Slovakia
Hungary
0 5 10 15 20 25
23.49
19.60
5.23
18.84
17.52
16.53
18.36
17.17
17.35
3.03
3.93
3.68
5.93
5.44
5.80
5.30
5.93
5.41
5.06
5.37
2011
2012
2013
2014
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by FSU Argus.
In the period 2012-2014, there was also a drop of over 20% in oil exports by 
sea. This applies above all to Primorsk, which saw a drop in oil transit of over 
30%, and Novorossiysk, with a fall of nearly 25% (detailed data concerning 
the transit of Russian crude oil via its Baltic and Black Sea ports is given in 
Table 5).
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Table 5. Russian crude oil exports to EU countries via Russia’s Baltic and 
Black Sea ports in the period 2011-2015 (million tonnes)
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Primorsk 65.5 63.1 47.2 40.6 43.8
Ust-Luga 0 11 16.2 14.2 17.9
Novorossiysk 25.5 27.6 21.6 21.6 19.1
Tuapse 3.35 0.76 0 0 0
Total 94.35 102.46 85 76.4 80.8
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by the FSU Argus.
On the one hand, the drop in oil exports along the various transmission 
routes was caused by changes in the logistics of Russian crude oil exports. 
The fall in quantities of crude oil exported via the Druzhba pipeline in 2012 was 
directly linked to the redirection of a part of Russian crude oil exports along 
the BTS-2 pipeline, which was activated in March 2012, and via the oil termi-
nal in Ust-Luga. In 2012 11.5 million tonnes of oil were exported via the new oil 
terminal in Ust-Luga. At the same time, the total volume of Russian oil exports 
via the Baltic ports (Primorsk, Ust-Luga) and the Druzhba pipeline remained at 
similar levels in the years 2011-2012: 123.9 million tonnes in 2011 and 126.4 mil-
lion tonnes in 2012. In the year 2013 oil exports via Ust-Luga did increase, to 16.2 
million tonnes, but this came at the expense of reducing the quantities exported 
via the terminal in Primorsk; the amount supplied via Druzhba remained at the 
level of 49.48 million tonnes, slightly less than in 2012.
The opening of the new terminal also led to a temporary reduction in the tran-
sit of crude oil via Primorsk; this was additionally affected by the decision to 
change the function of one branch of the BTS pipeline, which had previously 
been used for oil exports, to the transmission of diesel.
On the other hand, the reduction in Russian crude oil exports to the EU 
has primarily been caused by a change in the situation on the European 
market.
The main reason is the decline in oil consumption in the EU, resulting on the 
one hand from the economic downturn, and on the other from a change in the 
18
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
3/
20
16
structure of energy consumption in general (gas has become more important in 
the energy mix). The level of refinery output has also fallen steadily in European 
states. In the years 2008-13, the European refineries’ capacity dropped by nearly 
8%, and the number of refineries fell from 102 to 87, which led to a reduction in 
the output level of 80 million tonnes per annum. Many of the existing refineries 
are running at a loss or are barely breaking even.
According to the International Energy Agency’s latest forecasts, the long-term 
negative trend concerning oil consumption in the EU is likely to be maintained. 
The World Energy Outlook 2015 predicts a drop in oil consumption in the EU 
from 10.6 million barrels a day in 2014 (i.e. around 527.7 million tonnes per an-
num) to 8.9 million barrels a day (about 443 million tonnes per annum) in 2025; 
7.3 million barrels per day (363.4 million tonnes per annum) in 2035, and 6.6 
million barrels per day (328.5 million tonnes per annum) in 204015.
No less important are the domestic causes in Russia itself. In recent years, 
Russian refineries have consistently raised the levels of their own out-
put, which translates to an increase in exports of oil-derived products at 
the expense of crude oil. During the period 2004-14, the Russian refineries’ 
capacity rose by nearly 17% (from 5.42 million barrels a day in 2008 to 6.34 
million barrels a day in 2014), and their output has increased from 235.6 mil-
lion tonnes in 2008 to 288.9 million tonnes in 2014, an increase of 22.6%16. 
Russian companies are interested in increasing their refinery capacity be-
cause it strengthens their position on the domestic market, and also gives 
them the flexibility to respond to changing trends on foreign markets (rising 
demand for oil products).
many Russian oil companies, including Gazpromneft and Lukoil, have been 
obliged to restrict their exports in order to supply their own refineries in 
Russia because other providers have violated their contracts. This took place 
after Rosneft’s acquisition of the company TNK-BP in spring 2013. Rosneft be-
gan to revoke its contracts with TNK-BP to supply crude oil to refineries be-
longing to other Russian oil companies, which forced some of the exporters 
to increase supplies to their own refineries, for example, in May 2013 Rosneft 
15 See World Energy Outlook 2015, p. 119. It is worth noting that this estimate is lower than that 
previously reported in World Energy Outlook 2014.
16 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2015, p. 16, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/
bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-2015/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-
2015-full-report.pdf 
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stopped selling oil to TNK-BP for the refinery in Omsk (about 200,000 tonnes 
per month).
The temporary problems of supply to Europe, particularly via the Druzhba 
oil pipeline, are connected to the competition among Russian oil compa-
nies for export quotas awarded by the Russian Energy Ministry (these give 
companies the right to export specified quantities of oil to designated geographi-
cal targets).
For example, Rosneft was unable to start supplies on time to the Czech Republic, 
on the basis of the long-term contract it had concluded in June 2013, because it 
did not have sufficient export quotas (Lukoil and Gazpromneft did have suf-
ficient allocations). Rosneft eventually obtained additional allocations in ex-
change for permission to allocate export quotas17 to Lukoil and Gazpromneft 
to export oil via the Far Eastern port of Kozmino (the relevant agreement was 
concluded in July 2013; Lukoil gained access to ESPO and the Baltic ports by 
conceding to Rosneft its export quotas for supplies via Druzhba to the Czech 
Republic18).
5. a new ‘balance of oil powers’: Rosneft’s dominant position
In recent years, the state-owned oil company Rosneft has strengthened its 
unchallenged leading position among Russian oil exporters onto the EU 
market. It is now the principal exporter of crude oil, both by land (via the Dru-
zhba oil pipeline) and by sea. This is primarily due to its acquisition in spring 
2013 of TNK-BP, which has increased the level of Rosneft’s crude oil exports by 
more than 50% (the details of crude oil exports by Russian companies over the 
period 2011-15 are given in Table 6).
17 Trading in export quotas is officially prohibited. In April 2012, the Ministry of Energy of 
the Russian Federation did announce the introduction of legislative changes to allow the 
rotation of market allocations, but these plans have not yet been implemented. Thus in most 
cases, the ‘exchange of export quotas’ takes place without the necessary approval of the 
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, and remains the subject of informal arrange-
ments between the oil corporations.
18 Rosneft denied Czech access, Argus FSU, 4 July 2013, p. 11.
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Table 6. Russian oil exports during the period 2011-15 (in million tonnes)
Company 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Rosneft 59 60.9 94.3 ** 93.8 97.5 
TNk-Bp 29.8 30.1 - -  -
lukoil 23.8 24.6 20.3 19.3  22.6
Surgutneftegaz 27 26.7 28.8 26  29.9
Gazpromneft 12.7 11.9 7.7 7.5  7.9
Tatneft 15.6 11.9 11.4 8.5  10.4
Bashneft 3.6 4.5 4.1 4.9  5.3
Russneft 5.5 5.3 4.5 2.8  2.5
Others 11.1 13.2 12.9 13.4  15.9
Total 188.1 189.1 184 176.2  192
* Includes exports via the oil pipeline network belonging to Transneft, excluding deliveries to CIS 
countries
** Also includes exports by TNK-BP
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by the magazine Neftegazovaya vertikal and the FSU 
Argus.
Rosneft’s share in supplies via the oil pipeline Druzhba have more than quad-
rupled during the period 2011-14, from 6.2 million tonnes in 2011 to 26.5 mil-
lion tonnes in 2014. The biggest decline in this period was noted by Lukoil 
(from 8.9 million tonnes in 2011 to 5.5 million tonnes in 2014) and Tatneft (from 
7.7 million tonnes in 2011 to 3.2 million tonnes in 2014). The figures for the year 
2015 confirm these trends (supplies via Druzhba totalled almost 52.3 million 
tonnes, of which Rosneft was responsible for almost 28 million tonnes).
As for deliveries by sea, only Rosneft and Surgutneftegaz export crude oil from 
all the oil ports on the Baltic (Ust-Luga, Primorsk) and the Black Sea (Novoros-
siysk). In the years 2013-14 Rosneft’s exports via the Baltic port of Ust-Luga rose 
significantly, although its output via the ports in Primorsk and Novorossiysk 
fell. Via the port of Ust-Luga, Rosneft exported 6.3 million tonnes of crude oil 
to EU consumers in 2013, and 8.8 million tonnes in 2014. In 2013, it exported 
20.3 million tonnes to EU customers via Primorsk, and only 16.4 million tonnes 
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in 2015. From Novorossiysk, Rosneft exported 8.2 million tonnes to the EU in 
2013, and only 5.2 million tonnes in 2015.
Figure 4. Individual companies’ shares in Russian oil exports to the EU, totals 
in 2011 and 2014 (%)
2011
Rosneft – 12.8%
TNK-BP – 29.0%
Surgutneftegaz – 21.6%
LUKoil – 18.5%
Tatneft – 1.8%
Bashneft  – 6.0%
Russneft – 4.9%
Gazpromneft – 5.4%
2014
Rosneft – 56.1%
Surgutneftegaz – 15.2%
LUKoil – 11.7%
Tatneft – 7.8%
Bashneft – 4.9%
Russneft – 2.2%
Gazpromneft – 2.2%
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by FSU Argus. Figures do not include the so called 
small producers from Russia.
Surgutneftegaz ranks second in Russian oil suppliers to the EU, although the 
quantity of oil it exports has dropped steadily over recent years. This applies 
to both the Druzhba oil pipeline (a drop of close to 30%) and the Baltic ports: in the 
case of Primorsk, from 8.8 million tonnes in 2012 to 6 million tonnes in 2015; in 
Ust-Luga, from 6.6 million tonnes in 2013 to 5.1 million tonnes in 2014; in the case 
of Novorossiysk a drop from 2.8 million tonnes in 2011 to 0.1 million tonnes in 2015.
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The amount of oil exported to the EU by lukoil is also falling steadily. In 
the case of the Druzhba pipeline, the decrease during the period 2011-14 was 
about 38%, and about 45% via the Baltic ports. Lukoil’s supplies via the port of 
Novorossiysk have intermittently risen significantly, from 1.7 million tonnes in 
2011 to 7.3 million tonnes in 2013, although in 2015 this fell to 6.2 million tonnes. 
The main cause was the increase in supplies onto the domestic market in Russia.
The importance of the remaining Russian oil exporters is also decreasing, 
which is particularly evident in the cases of Gazpromneft (a decrease of over 
50% in the period 2011-14) and Tatneft (a decrease of nearly 50% for the period 
2011-14).
The downward trend affects both the deliveries via Druzhba, where Tatneft has 
recorded the largest fall in the amount of oil delivered (over 50%), and the sea 
route, which the companies mentioned above use in only negligible quantities.
In 2011, Gazpromneft exported 7.6 million tonnes (5.9 million tonnes via Pri-
morsk, 0.7 million tonnes via Novorossiysk and 0.8 million tonnes via Tua-
pse), and only 3.4 million tonnes in 2015 (0.6 million tonnes via Primorsk, and 
2.8 million via Novorossiysk). Meanwhile, Tatneft’s exports in 2015 amounted 
to 5.4 million tonnes of oil a figure of 22.9% less than in 2011.
Table 7. Exports of crude oil from Russia to the EU, by companies and trans-
mission routes, in the period 2011-15 (million tonnes)
Company Year primorsk Ust-luga Novorossiysk Tuapse Druzhba Total 
Rosneft
2011 25.1 - 8.8 0.55 6.2 40.65
2012 22.9 3.4 7.9 0.06 9.4 43.66
2013 20.3 6.3 8.2 0 20 54.8
2014 16.7 8.8 7.9 0 26.5 59.9
2015 16.4 8.7 5.2 0 27.8 58.1
TNk-Bp
2011 6.1 - 3.9 0.8 13.9 24.7
2012 4.8 1.9 3.7 0.2 13.2 23.8
2013 1.6 1.5 1 0 5.3 9.4
2014 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0
lukoil
2011 12.2 - 1.7 1 8.9 23.8
2012 10.5 0.3 5.5 0.1 8.1 24.5
2013 6.5 0 7.3 0 4.7 18.5
2014 6.7 0 5.4 0 5.5 17.6
2015 9.5 0 6.2 0 4.5 20.2
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Company Year primorsk Ust-luga Novorossiysk Tuapse Druzhba Total 
Surgutneft-
egaz
2011 8.3 - 2.8 0 10.3 21.4
2012 8.8 2.4 1 0 7.7 19.9
2013 7.7 6.6 0.1 0 7.7 22.1
2014 4.6 5.1 0.8 0 7.2 17.7
2015 6 6.8 0.1 0 8.1 21
Gazprom-
neft
2011 6.1 - 0.7 0.8 2.6 10.2
2012 5.9 1.5 0.8 0.3 2.9 11.4
2013 2.5 0.5 1 0 1.8 5.8
2014 2.7 0 1.7 0 1 5.4
2015 0.6 0 2.8 0 1.7 5.1
Tatneft
2011 1.5 - 4.5 0 7.7 13.7
2012 2.5 1 4.7 0 3.2 10.4
2013 3.6 0.3 1.2 0 4.6 9.7
2014 2.1 0 2.4 0 3.2 7.7
2015 3.4 0.7 1.3 0 4.4 9.8
Bashneft
2011 0.5 - 0.2 0 2.9 3.6
2012 1.1 0.5 0.6 0 2.2 4.4
2013 0 0.3 1 0 2.4 3.7
2014 0.1 0.3 2 0 2.3 4.6
2015 0.6 0.4 0.8 0 2.5 4.3
Russneft
2011 1.5 - 1.3 0.2 2.3 5.3
2012 1.2 0 1.8 0.1 2 5.1
2013 1 0.7 0.7 0 1.6 4
2014 1 0 0.5 0 1 2.5
2015 0.6 0.6 0.5 0 0.3 2
Small 
producers 
2011 4.2 - 1.6 0 2.6 8.4
2012 5.4 0 1.6 0 2.6 9.6
2013 4 0 1.1 0 1.4 6.5
2014 6.8 0 0.9 0 0.8 8.5
2015 6.7 0.7 2.2 0 1.1 10.7
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by FSU Argus.
another new trend which has arisen in recent years is a reduction in the 
number of Russian producers whose oil is delivered via the Druzhba pipe-
line to individual countries in Central Europe, leading to a de facto division 
of the Central European market among Russian exporters. Polish and German 
refineries are supplied mainly by Rosneft and Surgutneftegaz, and those in 
Slovakia and Hungary primarily by Lukoil, and to a lesser extent by Tatneft, 
Bashneft and Russneft.
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Table 8. List of Russian oil producers and their supplies via the Druzhba pipe-
line to individual customers in the EU 
  Germany poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary
2011
Rosneft
TNK-BP
Surgutneftegaz
Tatneft
Gazpromneft
Rosneft
TNK-BP
Surgutneftegaz 
Lukoil
Tatneft
Bashneft 
TNK-BP
Lukoil
Bashneft
Russneft
Gazpromneft
Lukoil
Tatneft
Russneft
TNK-BP
Lukoil
Tatneft
Russneft
 
2015
Rosneft Sur-
gutneftegaz 
Gazpromneft
Rosneft
Tatneft
Surgutneftegaz
Rosneft
 
Lukoil
Tatneft
Bashneft
Russneft
Lukoil
Tatneft
Bashneft
 
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by FSU Argus.
6. more direct contracts, and a change in the balance of power 
among the trading companies
An important phenomenon which typifies the current state of affairs is the rise 
in the number of contracts Russian exporters are concluding directly with their 
customers (particularly in the case of oil exported via the Druzhba pipeline). At 
the same time, a reconfiguration of power among the trading companies buying 
Russian oil is also noticeable.
A new development in Russia’s oil cooperation with Central European countries 
is the move by major Russian exporters towards direct contracts, thus re-
ducing the participation of trading companies in exporting Russian crude 
oil to countries in the region via the Druzhba pipeline19.
19 Some exporters continue to use the services of trading companies in oil exports via Dru-
zhba: Tatneft, Bashneft (for deliveries to the MOL refineries in Slovakia and Hungary) and 
other smaller producers use Normeston, and Russneft and Neftisa use Glencore.
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Table 9. Direct contracts signed by Russian companies to supply oil via 
the Druzhba pipeline in 2011-15
Exporter Contractor Importer country 
Date of 
contract’s 
signature
Import volume and dura-
tion of contracts
 Rosneft
PKN ORLEN
Poland
 
1 February 
2013
6 million tonnes per annum, 
in the period 1 February 2013 
– 31 January 2016 
30 
December 
2015
From 18 to 25.2 million tonnes, 
in the period 1 February 2016 
to 31 January 2019 (supplied 
via Druzhba or by sea)
Lotos Group
20 
December 
2013
2.4 million tonnes per an-
num, in the period 1 January 
2014 to 31 December 2016 
(supplied via Druzhba or by 
sea)
22 January 
2016
From 5.4 to 6 million tonnes, 
in the period 2016-2017 (sup-
plied via Druzhba or by sea)
PKN ORLEN
Czech 
Republic
21 June 2013
8.28 million tonnes, in the 
period 1 July 2013 – 30 June 
2016 
21 March 
2014
Additional 50,000 tonnes 
per month during the period 
1 April 2014 to 30 June 2016
30 April 
2015
120,000 tonnes per month 
Total
Germany
January 
2013
2 million tonnes, to 31 De-
cember 2013 
Shell
January 
2013
600,000 tonnes, to 31 Decem-
ber 2013
ENI March 2013
240,000 tonnes, to 31 Decem-
ber 2013
lukoil MOL
Hungary
2011
Average c. 300,000 tonnes 
per month.
Contract applies until the 
end of 2016 
Slovakia
Tatneft
Lotos Group
Poland
6 December 
2013
2.4 million tonnes annually, 
in the period 1 January 2014 
to 31 December 2016 
PKN ORLEN
23 
December 
2015
3.6 – 7.2 million tonnes annu-
ally, in the period 1 January 
2016 to 31 December 2018
Gazpromneft ENI Czech 
Republic 
December 
2013 
30-50,000 tonnes per month
(expired in 2014)
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by the Interfax agency and FSU Argus.
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At present, Rosneft is delivering its supplies via Druzhba mainly on the basis 
of direct contracts; the exception was a contract signed on 21 December 201220 
with the trading company Mercuria Energy Trading, to send 3.6 million tonnes 
of oil per annum to the PKN ORLEN refinery in Płock from 1 January 2013 to 
31 December 201521. In addition, Rosneft has concluded direct contracts with 
a number of other European customers: France’s Total, Shell of the Netherlands, 
and the Italian company Eni (a list of the largest oil contracts for deliveries via 
Druzhba is given in Table 9). In addition, thanks to an agreement with Unipetrol 
(a Czech subsidiary of PKN ORLEN), Rosneft started its first crude oil exports 
to the Czech Republic in July 2013, at the same time supplanting the Russian 
supplier Lukoil as leader of the local market, as well as Gazpromneft, which 
started in January 201522.
Lukoil also supplies crude oil it has produced to Slovakia and Hungary, on the 
basis of direct contracts with the Hungarian company MOL. In January 2014 the 
Lotos Group revoked its contract with the trading company Mercuria (which 
had been in operation since 2009, and provided for annual deliveries of 3.6 mil-
lion tonnes of crude oil). Direct contracts to supply oil to Poland have also been 
signed by Russia’s Tatneft, in December 2013 with the Lotos Group23 and in De-
cember 2015 with PKN ORLEN24. Surgutneftegaz has also entered into direct 
20 This was basically an extension of a contract between ORLEN and Mercuria Energy Trad-
ing in December 2009; http://www.orlen.pl/PL/BiuroPrasowe/Strony/PKN-ORLEN-przed-
luzyl-z-Mercuria-Energy-Trading-umowe-na-dostawy-ropy-naftowej.aspx
21 Regardless of this, in 2013 Rosneft signed contracts with trading companies to deliver oil via 
the Russian ports of Novorossiysk, Primorsk, and Ust-Luga, on the basis of prepayment. The 
contracts were agreed for five years and include supplies for Glencore (39.2 million tonnes), 
Vitol (16.8 million tonnes), and Trafigura (10.1 million tonnes); the sum received by Rosneft 
under the prepayment scheme amounted to US$9.8 billion.
22 This is connected with Unipetrol’s increase of its holding of shares in the CRC at the be-
ginning of 2014 to 67.6% (through the acquisition of 16.3% of the shares belonging to the 
Shell company). In April 2015, in turn, Unipetrol finalised the transaction of the remaining 
32.44% of shares owned by the Italian company Eni (until 2014 it had been bound by a con-
tract with Gazpromneft to supply oil). On 30 April 2015 it was reported that PKN ORLEN had 
concluded an additional agreement with Rosneft for the supply of 120,000 tonnes of oil per 
month during the period from 1 May 2015 to 30 June 2016; http://www.rosneft.com/print-
able/news/pressrelease/30042015.html (15 May 2015).
23 See the communiqué from the company: Conclusion of agreement between Tatneft Europe 
AG and the Lotos Group S.A., http://inwestor.lotos.pl/1185/p,194,i,749/raporty_i_dane/ra-
porty_biezace/zawarcie_umowy_znaczacej_pomiedzy_tatneft_europe_ag_a_grupa_lo-
tos_sa (20 October 2015).
24 The contract replaces the agreement between PKN ORLEN and the trading company Mer-
curia which expired in December 2015. See the communiqué from the company: ORLEN 
has contracted to supply crude oil to Płock from Tatneft Europe AG, http://www.orlen.pl/
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contracts with the European companies Eni, Shell and Total, to supply oil to 
German refineries; in doing so it has ended its long-time cooperation with the 
trading company Sunimex. One consequence of the Russian companies’ changes 
to their contract policies is a noticeable decline in the participation of trading 
companies in the trade in crude oil exported via the Druzhba pipeline, such as 
Mercuria (down 50% to 300,000 tonnes per month in 2014), and Sunimex (which 
until recently was a leader among traders buying oil supplied via Druzhba); its 
share on the German market has fallen from 77% in 2013 to 33% in 2014.
The main reason why Russian exporters have been signing direct contracts to 
supply their oil is to increase the proceeds from their sales. This was of particu-
lar importance for Rosneft, which incurred high costs associated with its 2013 
takeover of TNK-BP. Signing direct contracts with the importers was supposed 
to ease the concerns of the customer states and the European Commission re-
garding the risk of reducing the volume of exports sent via the Druzhba pipe-
line25. In addition to this, direct contracts, especially for Rosneft, were intended 
to strengthen the Russian exporters’ positions on the regional market, which 
will be increasingly important in the light of the expected fierce competition 
among global oil exporters.
The second important phenomenon is the change in the balance of power 
among the trading companies which buy Russian oil.
First, there has been a dramatic decrease in the importance of the trading 
company Gunvor26, which until recently had the largest share in trading Rus-
sian oil (up to 40%, according to sources at Reuters)27. Its share decreased to 7.1% 
in 2012, and to just 1% in the years 2013-2014. The decline in Gunvor’s importance 
to the Russian oil trade is primarily the consequence of rivalries within the 
Russian energy sector (the struggle for influence between Igor Sechin, the CEO 
of Rosneft, and Gennadiy Timchenko, co-owner of Novatek). In 2013, Rosneft, 
PL/BiuroPrasowe/Strony/ORLEN-zakontraktowa%C5%82-dostawy-ropy-naftowej-do-
P%C5%82ocka-od-Tatneft-Europe-AG.aspx (29 December 2015).
25 Роснефть сольет посредников, (4 February 2013), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc-y/2119720
26 A trading company registered in Switzerland; until March 2014 one of its main sharehold-
ers was Gennady Timchenko, a Russian oligarch who is a member of a close circle of busi-
ness elites.
27 Russian oil trading king Gunvor crown slips, http://www.reuters.com/article/gunvor-
idUSL5E8KC9OS20120914; Выход Тимченко из Gunvor не сказался на показателях 
трейдера, http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2014/09/26/gunvor-udvoil-sup-
plies-nalichnyh (20 October 2014).
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TNK-BP (which Rosneft acquired in mid-2013) and Surgutneftegaz all stopped 
selling crude oil to Gunvor. Moreover, an additional factor currently limiting 
Gunvor’s role is the US’s sanctions against Russia. On 19 March 2014 – the day 
before the publication of the list of American sanctions – Timchenko (whose 
name was one of those covered by the sanctions) sold a 43% stake in Gunvor to 
the shareholder Torbjorn Tornqvist. Meanwhile in autumn 2014, representa-
tives of the company announced their intention to sell many of their Russian 
assets, including some connected with oil: 50% of the shares in the oil terminal 
belonging to the company NTK (Nevskaya truboprovodnaya kompaniya), which 
runs the oil terminal in Ust-Luga, 100% of the shares in the terminal exporting 
oil products in Ust-Luga (Ust-Luga Oil)28, and 50% in the company NMT (Novo-
rossiyskiy mazutnyy terminal)29.
Secondly, there has been an increase in the number of trading companies 
buying Russian crude oil, mainly that which is exported via the Russian ports; 
this has led to the fragmentation of the market and a rise in competition. The 
policy of the trading companies themselves is also of some importance; during 
the period of high oil prices (2012-13), they preferred to trade oil on the spot mar-
kets, as there was little chance of obtaining the expected returns (low margins) 
on the basis of the contracts they had signed with Russian exporters.
Thirdly, there has been a rise in the importance of those trading compa-
nies which have concluded long-term oil agreements with Rosneft for sup-
plies30 based on the principle of prepayment. In 2013 Rosneft decided to enter 
into long-term contracts (five years) with trading companies, so that the pre-
payments would yield the necessary funds to pay off the debts it had incurred 
in connection with its acquisition of TNK-BP. Its agreements with Glencore and 
Vitol, providing for annual deliveries of 67 million tonnes (46.9 million to Glen-
core, 20.1 million to Vitol) yielded US$8.3 billion in prepayments; meanwhile 
its contract with the Swiss trading company Trafigura (which provides for 
annual supplies of 10.11 million tonnes of oil and oil-derived products) yielded 
a prepayment of US$1.5 billion. Confirmation of the growing participation of the 
28 In the light of press reports, the buyer may be Gazprombank, which already owns 24% of 
the shares in the terminal; Transneft has 26%. Gunvor нашла на покупателя Усть-Лугу, 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2015/06/26/598122-gunvor-nashla-poku-
patelya-na-ust-lugu (25 June 2015).
29 The buyer of the shares will most likely be Transneft. Транснефть купит у Gunvor Ново-
российский мазутный терминал,  https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2015/ 12/28/ 
622806-transneft (29 December 2015).
30 This does not apply to deliveries to Central European countries.
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abovementioned companies in Russian crude oil trade can be seen in the statis-
tics for the first half of 2015, from which it follows that Trafigura has acquired 
a leading position among Russian oil buyers (having bought about 7.6 million 
tonnes in the period January-June 2015).
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II. RUSSIa’S pOSITION ON THE OIl pRODUCT maRkET
For several years, Russia has been the world’s leading exporter of oil prod-
ucts, comfortably ahead of countries such as the United States (121 million 
tonnes), Singapore (79 million tonnes), the Netherlands (73 million tonnes) 
and India (71 million tonnes). It has been able to maintain its position as the 
world leader thanks to a consistent increase in the volume of its exports, from 
62.6 million tonnes in 2000 to 171.5 million tonnes in 2015.
1. The importance of the EU market for Russian exports of oil 
products
1.1. The EU’s market share in the export of oil products
The statistics published by the Russian Federal Customs Service show that in 
2014, over 94% of the exports of oil products from Russia went to countries out-
side the CIS area. The most important among these were EU member states. In 
2014 the EU market received a total of 114.2 million tonnes of crude oil products, 
which represents close to 70% of Russia’s total exports of oil products. It is worth 
noting that the EU’s market share in Russian exports has been rising steadily, 
by almost 7.8% in 2014 compared to the previous year.
Currently, over a quarter of Russian oil products exported to the EU goes to 
the Netherlands (26.1%)31. Its other major customers include Denmark (9.2%), 
Estonia (8.3%)32, Italy (6.8%), Germany (6.7%), France (6.4%), the United Kingdom 
(5%), Belgium (5.6%) and Malta (5%)33. These figures include both sea (from the 
Baltic and Black Sea ports) and land routes of transmission (rail and pipelines). 
Russian oil products sent via the Baltic mainly reach the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Estonia, Germany, Belgium, Great Britain and France. In turn, Russia’s Black Sea 
ports mostly34 send oil products to Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus.
31 Some of the crude oil products going to the Netherlands are re-exported to other EU countries. 
https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/cargo-industry/liquid-bulk/crude-oil (30 June 2015).
32 Estonia’s large participation is due to the fact that a significant proportion of the crude oil 
products it imports are re-exported.
33 Author’s own calculations, based on statistics published by FSU Argus.
34 The most important non-EU recipient of Russian crude oil products from the Black Sea 
ports (in particular Novorossiysk) is Turkey.
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The share of oil products in the total income from Russian oil exports 
(crude oil and oil products) continues to rise steadily. In 2001, the proceeds 
from the sale of oil and oil products totalled US$34.2 billion, a figure which 
had already risen to US$239.4 billion in 2008. Record levels were reported in 
2012, when the income from oil exports amounted to US$284.3 billion (a detailed 
summary for the period 2001-2015 is given in Table 10). The participation of EU 
countries in income from oil exports reached a record level of 78% in 2005, and 
fluctuated within the range of 64-76% in the following years.
The decrease in income from crude oil exports observed in the period 2011-14 
(from US$181.8 billion in 2011 to US$153.9 billion in 2014) was offset by an in-
crease in revenue from the export of oil products from Russia. Robust growth 
in earnings from exports of crude oil products in total oil exports came in the 
period 2009-2013 (from US$46.8 billion in 2009 to US$109 billion in 2013).
2015, on the one hand, has seen an increase in exports of crude oil and oil prod-
ucts, but on the other hand a significant decrease in revenue, which was mainly 
due to the drastic fall in oil prices (the average barrel of Urals in 2014 cost US$99; 
by 2015 the figure was about US$54).
Table 10. Revenue from the export of Russian oil and oil products (in US$ billion)
Year
price of 
oil
(US$ per 
barrel)
Crude oil
(in US$ billion)
Crude oil 
products
(in US$ 
billion)
Total
(in US$ 
billion)Total
For deliv-
eries
to the EU
Share of receipts 
from exports to the 
EU in income from 
total oil exports 
(in %)
2001 20.78 24.9 14.7 59 9.3 34.2
2002 21.02 29.1 18.3 63 11.2 40.3
2003 23.81 39.7 24.3 61 14 53.7
2004 31.02 59 33.3 56 19.2 78.2
2005 45.21 83.4 65.2 78 33.8 117.2
2006 56.32 102.3 78 76 44.6 146.9
2007 64.28 121.5 88.8 73 51.4 172.9
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Year
price of 
oil
(US$ per 
barrel)
Crude oil
(in US$ billion)
Crude oil 
products
(in US$ 
billion)
Total
(in US$ 
billion)Total
For deliv-
eries
to the EU
Share of receipts 
from exports to the 
EU in income from 
total oil exports 
(in %)
2008 90.68 161.1 116.2 72 78.3 239.4
2009 55.61 100.6 67.1 67 46.8 147.4
2010 74.11 135.8 87.5 64 69.4 205.2
2011 101 74 181.8 118.8 65 91.3 273.1
2012 103.14 180.9 131.3 72 103.4 284.3
2013 100.41 173.7 122.1 70 109.2 282.9
2014 94.22 153.9 103.8 67 109 262.9
2015 54 89.58 56.8 63.4 67.4 156.98
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by the Federal Customs Service of Russia.
1.2. The main oil-derived products exported by Russia to EU countries
The main product exported by Russian oil companies onto the European mar-
ket remains fuel oil. In 2014, its share in the export of oil products to the EU 
amounted to close to 47%35. In recent years, the volume of its export has been 
slightly but steadily decreasing (63.4 million tonnes in 2012; 59.1 million tonnes 
in 2014).
Another significant part of the Russian export of oil products into the EU is die-
sel (26.5%). According to FSU Argus, 49.1 million tonnes of diesel were exported 
from Russia in 2014, nearly 12% more than in the previous year (43.8 million 
tonnes), of which 22.9 million tonnes was sent via the pipeline network, nearly 
25 million tonnes by rail, and around 1.2 million tonnes by river36. From the data 
published by the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, it also appears 
35 According to the periodical Neftegazovaya vertikal, the share of fuel oil in the total export of 
Russian oil-derived products is even higher, even exceeding 50% (55.1% in 2012, 56% in 2013).
36 In turn, according to data from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, Russian 
exports of diesel amounted to 45.4 million tonnes in 2014 (36.4 million tonnes in 2011, 35.9 
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that both the production and export of oil are rising steadily. Diesel oil of infe-
rior quality (high-sulphation) is mainly assigned for export purposes.
Table 11. Production and export of diesel in 2011-15 (million tonnes)
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Production 70.6 69.4 72.6 77.3 76.05
Export 36.4 35.9 38.8 45.4 46
Source: http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/iblock/66a/66a29d8d8e1537fe12327a4dea355a5d.pdf 
The third most important product in terms of Russian exports onto the EU 
market is naphtha. In 2014 total Russian exports of naphtha increased sig-
nificantly (by 22.3%, from 17.8 million tonnes in 2013 to 22.1 million tonnes in 
2014; the size of the increase is even more apparent in relation to 2011’s figure 
of 12.6 million tonnes), about 52.7% of which reaches the EU market. This is il-
lustrated by data relating to the export of naphta from Russia’s European ports, 
mostly from Ust-Luga (an increase of 158% from 3.6 million tonnes in 2013 to 
9.3 million tonnes in 2014) and Tuapse (an increase of 25.4%, from 3.7 million 
tonnes in 2013 to 4.7 million tonnes in 2014). In 2014 both ports handled nearly 
64% of Russia’s total naphtha exports37.
The EU market also receives vacuum gas oil (VGO) and small quantities of 
Russian gasoline, representing around 7.2% and 2.6% respectively of Russian 
exports to the EU38.
2. Export routes of Russian oil-derived products
Russian oil-derived products are exported onto the EU market along several 
transit routes: principally by sea (via Russia’s Baltic ports, ports in Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia, and Black Sea ports) and to a small extent overland (via rail 
and pipeline).
million tonnes in 2012 and 38.8 million tonnes in 2013). http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/ibl
ock/66a/66a29d8d8e1537fe12327a4dea355a5d.pdf 
37 Author’s own calculations, based on data published by FSU Argus concerning the target 
markets for crude oil exports sent via the Baltic and Black Sea ports.
38 Other oil-derived products account for less than 7% of exports, and include LPG and fuel for 
jet engines.
34
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
3/
20
16
2.1. The sea route
The majority of exports of Russian oil products onto the EU market comes via 
the Baltic ports (primarily Primorsk, Ust-Luga and Vysotsk; to a lesser extent 
Petersburg and Kaliningrad); almost 55% of deliveries were carried out via these 
ports in 2014. In recent years, however, the importance of transit via the Baltic 
states’ ports has fallen consistently compared to the Russian ports, both those 
on the Baltic and the Black Sea (Russian exports of oil products via ports on the 
Baltic and the Black Sea are listed in Table 12).
Table 12. Russian exports of oil products exported via the Baltic ports during 
the period 2012-2014 (million tonnes per annum)
Co
un
tr
y
port
2012 2013 2014
by rail pipeline
to
ta
l
by rail pipeline
to
ta
l
by rail pipeline
to
ta
l
Ru
ss
ia
Primorsk – 6.5 6.5 0 9.3 9.3 0 11.3 11.3
Ust–Luga 12.7 – 12.7 15.9 – 15.9 22.5 – 22.5
Petersburg 7.3 – 7.3 6.7 – 6.7 6.4 – 6.4
Vysotsk 10.3 – 10.3 10.5 – 10.5 11.2 – 11.2
Kaliningrad 3.9 – 3.9 2 – 2 3.3 – 3.3
Total 34.2 6.5 40.7 35.1 9.3 44.4 43.4 11.3 54.7
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Klaipeda 0.7 – 0.7 0.4 – 0.4 0.4 – 0.4
La
tv
ia
Riga 3.6 – 3.6 4.1 – 4.1 5.6 – 5.6
Ventspils 2.5 6.3 6.8 5.9 5.4 11.3 5.2 5.7 10.9
Liepaja 0.13 – 0.13 0.1 – 0.11 0.1 – 0.1
Total 6.23 6.3 12.53 10.1 5.4 15.5 10.9 5.7 16.6
Es
to
ni
a Tallinn 8.7 – 8.7 8.6 – 8.6 3.3 – 3.3
Sillamäe 2 – 2 2 – 2 2.3 – 2.3
Total 10.7 – 10.7 10.6 – 10.6 5.6 – 5.6
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by FSU Argus.
In the period 2012-14, Russian exports of oil-derived products via the Baltic 
ports of Russia rose by over 34%. The port of Ust-Luga is acquiring the most 
importance in exports onto the EU market (exports rose by more than 77% in 
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the period 2012-2014), as is the port of Primorsk (exports rose by almost 74% in 
the period 2012-2014).
The growing importance of Russia’s Baltic ports is also demonstrated by the data 
on the quantities of oil products being transmitted, nearly 55 million tonnes 
in 2014 (40.7 million tonnes in 2013); for comparison, Latvian ports supplied 
a total of 16.6 million tonnes, and Estonian ports 5.6 million tonnes. The biggest 
decrease (nearly 50%) was recorded at the port in Tallinn; in 2012 the Estonian 
capital exported 10.7 million tonnes of Russian oil products, but only 5.6 million 
tonnes in 2014. The biggest decline in exports through the Baltic ports affects 
fuel oil; exports through ports in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania fell by more 
than 50% in 2014 to 3.99 million tonnes (Tallinn saw the biggest fall, of 64.8%). 
The slight increases in the exports of certain products via Baltic state ports are 
only temporary. One example is the export of Russian fuel oil by pipeline to the 
port of Ventspils; the rise in exports from 5.4 million tonnes in 2013 to 5.7 mil-
lion tonnes in 2014 is more related to Rosneft’s bigger exports from refineries 
in Samara (the importance of this route is expected to decline in 2015, with 
a projected drop of up to 2.5-3 million tonnes per annum).
Furthermore, the importance of the Black Sea ports in Russia’s export of oil-
derived products to Europe is consistently growing. The port of Novorossiysk 
is becoming crucially important; Russian exports of oil-derived products rose 
by almost 32%, from 11.9 million tonnes in 2012 to 15.7 million tonnes in 2014. 
Exports via the port of Tuapse remain steady (5.75 million tonnes in 2012; 6.1 mil-
lion tonnes in 2014). The increase in the importance of the Black Sea ports is 
especially apparent in the case of Russian fuel oil exports: both Novorossiysk 
(up by 33.7%, to 7.83 million tonnes in 2013) and Tuapse (by 11.55%, to 4.8 million 
tonnes).
The rise in the importance of Russia’s Black Sea and Baltic ports in its ex-
ports of oil products, at the expense of the Baltic states’ ports, is primarily 
a result of the policy consistently implemented by the Russian govern-
ment. Its goal is to create the conditions whereby moscow can (if it deems 
such action necessary) take the political decision to totally redirect the 
export of oil from the Baltic states’ ports to Russian routes.
One of the principal instruments of the Russian strategy is tariff policy. Cur-
rently, tariffs on the transmission of diesel fuel to the Latvian port of Ventspils 
are lower than those which apply to routes leading from individual Russian 
refineries to Primorsk. However, Transneft has been consistently raising the 
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levels of tariffs for the transport of diesel fuel via the pipeline network. The 
latest increases (which took effect as of 1 February 2015) are much higher in the 
case of routes to the Latvian port of Ventspils (by an average of 8.8%) than on 
those routes connecting the refineries with the Russian port of Primorsk (an 
average increase of about 6%). For example, since 1 February 2015 the tariff on 
the transmission of diesel fuel from the refineries in Moscow to the port of Pri-
morsk has been almost 1340 roubles, but only around 910 roubles to the port of 
Ventspils; the increase in the case of the first route was 6.26%, but 10% for the 
second. It is very likely that this policy will continue; the effect of these changes 
will further weaken the competitiveness and, consequently, the importance of 
the Latvian route for exporting Russian oil.
The second element is the consistent increase in the transmission capacity 
of the Russian Baltic ports, and the expansion of the transit infrastruc-
ture (including pipelines), allowing Russia to increase the export of oil-derived 
products. By 2020, Transneft plans to expand the network’s capacity from the 
current 31 million tonnes to 54.5 million tonnes, leading to the Baltic ports (the 
North pipeline), and from Samara to Novorossiysk (the South pipeline). The 
North pipeline’s capacity to transport oil-derived products is currently 8.4 mil-
lion tonnes per annum. Transneft has therefore decided to expand the pipeline’s 
capacity to 25 million tonnes, in three stages: (1) to 13-14 million tonnes at the 
turn of 2015; (2) to 18 million tonnes by 2017; (3) to 25 million tonnes by 2018. 
Transneft’s plans also include a project to construct a South pipeline, which is 
intended to serve the transit of oil-derived products along the Syzran-Saratov-
Volgograd-Novorossiysk route. The operation is scheduled to start in 2016, and 
the initial capacity is estimated at 6 million tonnes per annum, to be eventu-
ally increased to 8.7 million tonnes annually. A problem may lie in the attitude 
adopted by the Russian Railway (RZhD) concerning the rate of the transport 
tariffs (which represent one of the main items in RZhD’s budget revenue), and 
in the difficulty of managing the funds to expand the planned pipeline infra-
structure (according to estimates in autumn 2014, 25-26 billion roubles will be 
needed to expand the North pipeline). Besides, RZhD has not yet constructed 
the rail lines along the line to Primorsk via Vyborg–Primorsk–Yermolovo39.
Russia’s actions to date confirm that the strategy of marginalising exports 
via latvian ports is being put into practice. any escalation of tensions be-
tween moscow and the Baltic States could contribute to an intensification 
39 Российские нефтяники ищут замену Латвии, http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/arti-
cles/2014/10/16/neftyaniki-ischut-zamenu-latvii (16 October 2015).
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of this programme. This is demonstrated by Transneft’s public contemplation 
of plans to redirect all its supplies to Russian ports. During a special meeting of 
a government commission in October 2014, this proposal was supported by key 
Russian exporters of oil-derived products, namely Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutnefte-
gaz, Bashneft, Tatneft and Gazpromneft.
2.2. The land route
As for Russian exports of oil-derived products to the EU via rail, the target cus-
tomers include Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Hungary. This route is mostly used to export fuel oil (mostly to Lithuania; 
small amounts also go to Finland) and LPG (mainly to Poland and Finland).
The pipeline network is also currently used to export Russian oil to Hungary. 
However, the amounts are not significant and, in recent years, a steady fall in 
the supply has been noted (from 820,000 tonnes in 2013 to 460,000 tonnes in 
2014, a decrease of 43.8%).
3. The reasons for the rise in exports of oil-derived products
The rise in Russian exports of oil-derived products onto the EU market has been 
caused by both internal and external considerations. The former include the 
Russian government’s fiscal policies, and the changes on the domestic market 
accompanying them. The most important of the latter include the trends in the 
production and consumption of oil products in the EU.
One of the reasons why exports of oil products are steadily rising is the actions 
of the Russian government, although these are not motivated so much by 
the interests of the oil sector, as by the traditional40 desire to increase 
budget revenues in the light of the state’s deteriorating financial situation.
One particular illustration of this approach is the fiscal changes to the oil sec-
tor introduced by the government of the Russian Federation. In 2011, changes 
were introduced to export duties on oil-derived products: the duty on fuel oil 
was raised from 46.7% to 66%; in contrast, the rate of customs duty on highly-
processed products – with the exception of gasoline and naphtha – was lowered 
40 Targeting specific markets, as an essential criterion for increasing budgetary revenues, has 
long been one of the major weaknesses of Russian fiscal policy in the oil sector. More on this 
topic in Konończuk, op. cit., pp. 42-48.
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from 67% to 66%. At the same time, a progressive decline in export duty on diesel 
fuel was introduced: from 66% to 65% in 2014, to 63% in 2015, and to 61% in 2016.
In an attempt to encourage producers to manufacture as much high-processed 
product as possible, the Government adopted a law in autumn 2014 introducing 
a so-called tax manoeuvre, levelling the export duty on fuel oil to that of crude 
oil. At the same time, the rates for high-processed product were substantially 
lowered; for example, the duty on diesel fuel was reduced from 48% to 30%, and 
that on gasoline from 78% to 30%. The most serious consequences were felt by 
Rosneft, Bashneft and Tatneft (these companies have experienced enormous 
delays in upgrading their refineries), whereas the biggest beneficiary – given 
the capacity of its refineries – is most likely to be Lukoil, hence the considerable 
resistance to the new solutions expressed by Rosneft’s CEO Igor Sechin (Rosneft 
is the largest producer and exporter of fuel oil).
The government’s fiscal policy is also clear in the context of setting the excise 
duty on diesel and gasoline; the authorities have set high ceilings on products 
which have a high sulphur content.
Table 13. Excise duties on diesel and gasoline (in thousands of roubles per 
tonne) and shares of fuel types in total fuel production (%)
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Class 3
(150 
ppm) 
2.485 10
3.814
(1st half)
4.3
(2nd half)
16 5.86 30 6.446 18
Class 4
(50 
ppm)
2.247 10 3.562 9 4.934 10 5.427 7
Class 5
(10 
ppm)
2.247 17
3.562
(1st half)
2.962
(2nd half)
25 4.334 43 4.767 58
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Class 3 5.672 41 7.382 30 9.75 15 10.725 11
Class 4 5.143 26 6.822 37 8.56 17 9.416 9
Class 5 5.143 2
6.822
(1st half)
5.143
(2nd half)
25 5.143 63 5.657 75
Source: http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/iblock/66a/66a29d8d8e1537fe12327a4dea355a5d.pdf 
One consequence of the fiscal changes is an increase in the level of output from 
Russian refineries. The period 2011-14 has seen an increase of 12.7%. The level of 
investment in the refining sector has almost doubled (from 155 billion roubles 
in 2011 to 289.6 billion roubles in 2014)41.
Table 14. Output from refineries in Russia during the period 2011-15 (million 
tonnes) and investment in the modernisation of refineries
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Refineries output (million tonnes) 256.5 265.4 274.5 288.9 290
Size of investments in modernising 
refineries (billion roubles)
155 178 259.5 289.6 214
Source: http://minenergo.gov.ru/node/92 
41 Итоги работы ТЭК России в 2014 году. Задачи на среднесрочную перспективу, http://
minenergo.gov.ru/node/92
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Table 15. Production of the main oil-derived products in Russia in the period 2011-15
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gasoline 36.6 38.2 38.7 38.3 39.2
Diesel 70.6 69.4 72 77.3 76.05
Fuel oil 73.3 74.5 76.8 78.4 71.7
Source: http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/iblock/66a/66a29d8d8e1537fe12327a4dea355a5d.pdf 
The state’s actual objectives are also clearly demonstrated by its tariff policy. 
Transneft has been consistently raising the tariffs for the transmission oil 
products for export via the pipeline network (the most recent increases aver-
aged 3.5%42); these actually represent nearly 70% of the total products sent via 
Transneft’s pipeline system (those intended for the domestic market amount 
to about 30%). At the same time, the company has been reducing its tariffs on 
the transportation of oil products for the domestic market, which it treats as 
a kind of support for local companies operating in the deteriorating economic 
situation.
In the case of certain oil products, the rise in exports is associated with the 
technical limitations of Russian refineries. This applies in particular to fuel oil, 
which arises as a secondary raw material during the initial processing of oil. 
Few Russian refineries have the technical capabilities to carry out the necessary 
secondary processing, which means that fuel oil still retains a significant share 
in total Russian exports of oil-derived products.
The increase in exports of oil-derived products is also affected by the situation 
on the EU market for oil products.
Although the largest quantitative contribution to the export of Russian oil-de-
rived products is made by fuel oil, the product which holds most promise for the 
future is diesel. This is primarily seen in the increase in demand for diesel fuel 
42 These rates vary according to the specific transit route: for example, for the Slavneft refin-
ery (whose owners are Rosneft and Gazpromneft, operating through a joint consortium) 
the tariff for transmission from the refinery in Yaroslavl to Primorsk was raised by 22%, 
and for the Moscow refinery belonging to Gazpromneft, it was raised by 7.5%. Транснефть 
повышает тарифы на экспорт нефтепродуктов, http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/
articles/2015/05/25/593375-transneft-povishaet-tarifi-na-eksport-nefteproduktov (24 
May 2015).
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in the EU over recent years. Already in 2012, diesel cars made up about 65% of the 
total number of vehicles in the EU (according to forecasts, this figure will rise 
to 75% in 2035). In turn, according to forecasts by Wood Mackenzie, the diesel 
market in the EU may rise from 234.9 million tonnes in 2012 to 274.4 million 
tonnes in 202043. Due to internal regulations, a significant part of overall diesel 
consumption in the EU is made up of low-sulphur diesel fuel (10 ppm), the total 
consumption of which in EU countries amounted to 207 million tonnes in 2013.
Seeing a chance to increase their market share in the EU, Russian energy com-
panies have significantly increased their production of diesel. In 2012 Russian 
refineries doubled their production capacity of diesel with a low sulphur content 
(from 8 to 16 million tonnes per annum, which may double the export of 10 ppm 
diesel). The main producers are Lukoil, Gazpromneft and Surgutneftegaz.
43 Дизельная гонка: впереди тупик?, Нефтегазовая вертикаль, 10/2014.
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III. RUSSIaN INvESTmENTS IN OIl aSSETS  
ON THE EU maRkET
Regarding Russian oil activity in Europe in recent years, it is noteworthy 
that of the Russian energy companies present on the European market, 
only Rosneft has really increased its share of investments in the EU. Other 
companies, despite having previously declared their interest in EU assets, have 
withdrawn from their plans (Gazpromneft, Surgutneftegaz); some have even 
sold the assets they had previously acquired (Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz).
Table 16. Shares of Russian companies in refineries in the EU44
Company Country Refinery Capacity(barrels per day)
Share owned by 
Russian company
Ro
sn
ef
t Germany
Gelsenkirchen 265,000
100%
(through Ruhr Oel)
Schwedt 208,000
54.2%
(through Ruhr Oel)
Karlsruhe 301,000
24%
(through Ruhr Oel)
Neustadt-Vohburg 210,000
25%
(through Ruhr Oel)
Italy Sarroch 300,000
12% of
shares in the Saras 
company
lu
ko
il
Bulgaria Burgas
194,000
(176,000)
100% of shares
Romania Ploiesti (Petrotel) 53,000,(50,000) 100% of shares
Netherlands Zeeland (Vlissingen) 71,000 45% of shares
Italy Isab* 320,000 80% of shares
* Purchased by Lukoil in 2008; lost US$100 million in 2012.
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by FSU Argus and Neftegazovoye obozrenie 
[Нефтегазовое обозрение]
44 Meanwhile, refinery assets in non-EU countries are owned by Gazpromneft and Zarubiezh-
neft. The former controls refineries in Pančevo and Novi Sad in Serbia (56.15% of shares, in 
the company NIS); the latter, a refinery in Bosanski Brod in Bosnia & Herzegovina (79.99% 
of its shares, in the company OAO NeftegazInKor). Data from http://ir.nis.eu/about-the-
company/group-structure-hide/ (9 February 2015) and http://www.rafinerija.com/eng/on-
ama.html (10 February 2015). In addition, Gazpromneft owns 322 petrol stations in Serbia, 
and Zarubiezhneft owns 82 in Bosnia & Herzegovina (it bought 79 stations in 2007 at a cost 
of US$150 million). Data from: http://www.zarubezhneft.ru/en/operations/downstream/ 
(9 February 2015). Gazpromneft is also the owner of an oil and lubricant plant in Bari, Italy: 
http://www.gazpromneft-oil.com/clients/gpn.nsf/all/m01 
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Rosneft has mainly expanded its investments to cover the German and 
Italian markets. In May 2011, the Russian group spent US$1.6 billion to acquire 
50% of shares in the Ruhr Oel GmbH company (a joint venture with BP), through 
which it obtained stakes in four German refineries: Gelsenkirchen (100% of 
shares), PCK Raffinerie GmbH (in Schwedt, 37.5% of shares), MiRO (in Karslruhe, 
24% of shares) and Bayernoil (in Neustadt-Vohburg, 25% of shares)45. Thanks to 
the acquisition of a 50% stake in the Ruhr Oel refinery, Rosneft’s refinery capac-
ity has risen by 21%. Rosneft’s acquisitions in Ruhr Oel helped increase its export 
of oil-derived products in 2011 to countries outside the CIS by 19.2%, up to 30.41 
million tonnes (without the German refineries, its export figure would have 
fallen by about 4%, due to the need to increase the supply of diesel and fuel oil 
onto the domestic market). During the St. Petersburg International Economic 
Forum in June 2014, Rosneft and BP agreed on the reorganisation of Ruhr Oel. As 
a result of this agreement, Rosneft increased its stake in Bayernoil from 12.5 to 
25%, in MiRO from 12 to 24%, and in PCK Raffinerie of 18.75 to 37.5%; BP, in turn, 
obtained 100% of the shares in the Gelsenkirchen refinery46.
On 28 November 2014, Rosneft’s chairman Igor Sechin signed a contract with 
the French company Total to acquire 16.67% of the PCK Raffinerie GmbH, al-
lowing the Russian group to increase its joint stake with Ruhr Oel GmbH in 
the refinery to 54.2%47. Ruhr Oel GmbH is the market leader in oil processing 
in Germany (around 21 million tonnes in 2014), and the main supplier of oil 
is Rosneft (supplies from the Russian company amount to around 360,000 
tonnes per month). Rosneft is also still interested in modernising the Ingol-
stadt-Kralupy-Litvinov oil pipeline (via which oil is delivered from Germany 
to the Czech Republic) so that oil can f low along it in both directions, thus 
allowing the transit of Russian oil48.
In June 2013, speculation appeared in Russian press sources (the newspaper 
Vedomosti) about negotiations on Rosneft’s acquisition of stakes in the Polish 
45 Ruhr Oel GmbH also holds shares in five pipelines leading to the above-mentioned refiner-
ies; it is also a shareholder in oil terminals on the Baltic, the Adriatic, the North Sea and the 
Mediterranean. 
46 Роснефть и ВР подписали соглашения в области добычи, геологоразведки и нефтепе-
реработки, http://www.rosneft.ru/printable/news/pressrelease/190620152.html (23 June 2015).
47 The agreement on the acquisition of shares from Total was confirmed on 19 June 2015 during 
the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. The other shareholders in the Schwedt 
refinery are Shell (37.5%) and Eni (8.33%), http://rosneft.ru/news/pressrelease/190620155.
html (23 June 2015).
48 Saras co-operation on cards, Argus FSUE, 3 October 2013, p. 5.
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oil group PKN ORLEN and the Mažeikiai refinery49. Although no agreement 
was concluded, and the report was met with a strong rebuttal by the Polish 
company and the Polish government (the Treasury), the emergence of this type 
of speculation shows that Rosneft is interested in expanding its presence in 
Central Europe.
In 2013 Rosneft also took a 20.99% stake in the Italian company Saras, which 
controls the Sarroch refinery located in Sardinia, one of Italy’s largest (it pro-
cesses 300,000 barrels per day, or about 15 million tonnes per annum). Besides 
this, Saras has fuel stores in Italy and Spain and a network of 124 petrol sta-
tions in southern Spain. It is true that even in October 2014 reports appeared 
that Rosneft was interested in continuing to increase its stake in Saras, and in 
June 2013 Saras and Rosneft signed an agreement to create a joint venture to 
trade crude oil and oil-derived products; however the plans were postponed 
that August, due to the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West, and in 
October 2015 the Russian company’s representatives reported the conclusion of 
a contract to sell 8.99% of its stake in the Italian company50.
Rosneft also owns (via Ruhr Oel) 11% of shares in the Tal pipeline51 (the other 
shareholders are OMV [25%], Shell [24%], Eni [10%], BP [9%] and ExxonMobil 
[6%]).
In contrast to Rosneft, other Russian oil companies are not presently dis-
playing any interest in investing in the region, and some are even selling 
off their assets.
Examples of this include the Russian group lukoil, which in August 2014 an-
nounced the decision to sell 44 of its petrol stations in the Czech Republic (to 
the Hungarian group MOL), 19 in Slovakia, and 75 in Hungary (to the Norm 
Benzinkút Kft company). Their decision was related to investment concerns 
49 PKN Orlen просится под крыло Роснефти, http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/arti-
cles/2013/06/27/pkn_orlen_prositsya_pod_krylo_rosnefti (28 June 2013); Роснефть и PKN 
Orlen опровергли слухи о возможной сделке, http://uaenergy.com.ua/post/14690 (28 
June 2013).
50 Роснефть планирует увеличить долю в итальянской Saras, http://1prime.ru/com-
panies/20141028/794798718.html. Rosneft has also become the largest shareholder in 
Pirelli, the Italian tyre manufacturer (13% of shares for €500 million euro); Роснефть 
договорилась о продаже 8,99% доли в компании Saras S.p.A., http://rosneft.ru/news/
pressrelease/20102015.html
51 An oil pipeline 753 km in length that runs from the Italian port of Trieste via Austria to 
Germany.
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arising from the introduction of sanctions by the US and the EU against Russia52. 
In addition, Lukoil announced the sale of 240 petrol stations and 6 oil storage 
units in Ukraine to the Austrian company AMIC Energy Management GmbH53. 
In April 2015, the company Litasco – a trader for Lukoil established in 2000, 
which is responsible for selling 85% of the company’s oil and 100% of its oil-
derived products (under the total control of Lukoil) – signed a contract to sell 
its shares in the service terminal in Rotterdam (STR-Service Terminal Rotter-
dam), which has a 65,000 m3 volume of storage space, mainly to hold fuel oil54. 
In June 2015 Lukoil also announced the sale of 100% of shares in the company 
Lukoil Eesti AS, which owns 37 petrol stations in Estonia55; and in December 
2015 it announced the sale of all of its petrol stations in Lithuania and Latvia56. 
The Russian group has also withdrawn from joint renewable energy projects. 
On 25 June 2015 Lukoil signed a contract with ERG Renew (an Italian company) 
to dissolve the LUKERG Renew joint venture, created in 2011, whose aim was to 
develop wind energy projects in Bulgaria and Romania57.
52 Russia’s LUKoil Sells Petrol Stations in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 5 August 2014, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-s-lukoil-sells-petrol-stations-
in-czech-republic-slovakia-hungary/504573.html 
53 Russia’s Lukoil says sells filling stations in Ukraine to AMIC, http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2014/07/31/russia-lukoil-ukraine-idUSL6N0Q61Q420140731 (31 July 2014).
54 Лукойл продаст сервисный терминал в Роттердаме, http://www.vedomosti.ru/busi-
ness/news/2015/04/02/lukoil-prodast-servisnii-terminal-v-rotterdame (30 June 2025).
55 Лукойл объявил о продаже сети АЗС в Эстонии, http://top.rbc.ru/business/03/06/2015/55
6eb6209a79472fc9335492 (3 May 2015).
56 ЛУКОЙЛ продает активы в Литве и Латвии, http://interfax.com.ua/news/econom-
ic/313679.html (25 December 2015).
57 As a result of the agreement, there will be a division of assets between the shareholders: 
Lukoil will remain the owner of the Topolog wind power plant in Romania, whereas ERG 
Renew will own the wind power plants at Khrabrovo and Cherga in Bulgaria and Gebeleizis 
in Romania. Лукойл выходит из проектов возобновляемой энергетики в Болгарии, 
http://www.newsbg.ru/ekonomika/100-ekonomika/12338-lukojl-vyhodit-iz-proektov-
vozobnovljaemoj-energetiki-v-bolgarii.html
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Table 17. Petrol stations owned by Russian companies in Europe 
Name of company Country Number of stations
Zarubiezhneft Croatia No data
Lukoil
Finland 451
Romania 328
Bulgaria 221
Belgium 179
Lithuania 119
Poland 115
Hungary 76
Netherlands 76
Latvia 56
Czech Republic 44
Croatia 44
Estonia 37
Cyprus 31
Slovakia 16
Italy 16
Author’s own calculations
Lukoil’s total investments in the EU amount to about US$8.8 billion, which in-
cludes shares (with a total value of US$6.8 billion) in four refineries: Burgas 
(Bulgaria), Ploiesti (Romania), Zeeland (Netherlands) and Isab (Italy) – the EU’s 
third largest in terms of refinery capacity – and 1773 petrol stations (US$1.8 bil-
lion). From all these refineries Lukoil gained a daily capacity of 572,000 barrels, 
which is about 3% of the EU’s total refinery capacity, and Lukoil’s output from 
the above-mentioned refineries stand at 21.1 million tonnes. Besides, each of 
Lukoil’s European refineries has a higher Nelson index58 than any of its Russian 
refineries (ISAB 9.3; Ploiesti 10; Burgas 8.9; Zeeland 8.4).
58 An indicator of the refinery’s technological advancement.
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Some of Lukoil’s assets are controlled by Litasco, which owns the service ter-
minal in Rotterdam. Besides this, Litasco is the co-owner of one of the largest 
oil terminals in Europe, with a capacity of 1 million m3, through a joint venture 
with Spanish Meroil (set up in 2010). It was opened in April 2012.59
In March 2012, Litasco’s CEO Sergei Chaplygin said that investments in refin-
eries are important for Lukoil, even if only for the sake of oil projects in Iraq. 
He added, however, that the currently difficult situation in Europe (the drop in 
refinery output) means that the Russian company is not expected to increase 
its market shares in the near future.
Gazpromneft has also given up on its investment plans for the time being, hav-
ing declared an interest in investing in oil assets in Central Europe in the years 
2010-12. In 2010, the company declared an interest in acquiring a 51.19% stake in 
the Lotos Group (primarily in the context of the use of the oil terminal and four 
refineries belonging to Lotos, in Gdansk, Jasło60, Czechowice61and the Glimar 
refinery in Gorlice62). Rosneft and TNK-BP also declared their interest in these 
assets63. In March 2011 reports appeared that Gazpromneft was considering the 
acquisition of a block of 32.44% of shares (belonging to Eni) in the Czech com-
pany CRC (Česká rafinerská, the largest crude oil company in the Czech Repub-
lic). In April 2011 there were further reports that Gazpromneft was interested 
in acquiring 8.3% of Eni’s shares in the Schwedt refinery. Gazpromneft’s aspira-
tions resulted from the fact that its oil exports to Europe had increased, which 
stirred interest in increasing its processing power. TNK-BP was also interested 
in acquiring a stake in the Lotos group (before its own takeover by Rosneft)64.
In September 2011, reports emerged that Gazpromneft was looking to create 
subsidiaries in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in order 
59 http://www.lukoil.ru/press_6_5div__id_21_1id_23482.html (25 June 2015).
60 The refinery in Jasło ceased processing crude on 1 November 2008. The group, which is still 
part of the Lotos Group, now deals exclusively with the provision of services on behalf of 
the Lotos Group and other actors in areas directly adjacent to it, in the field of media distri-
bution, water and wastewater management, leases and facility management; http://www.
lotos.pl/165/grupa_kapitalowa/nasze_spolki/lotos_infrastruktura 
61 This refinery was converted into a terminal which is currently used for storage and distri-
bution of fuels.
62 Currently not operational.
63 Россия готовится купить польские нефтяные активы, http://uaprom.info/news/96618-
rossija-gotovitsja-privatizirovat-polskie-neftjanye-aktivy--ugmk-info-.html (20 June 2015).
64 Gazpromneft’ eyes Czech refining stake, Argus FSUE, 18 March 2011, p. 5.
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to increase its market share of oil products. In April 2012, there was a report that 
Gazpromneft was interested in investing in a 35.5% share of the Hellenic Petro-
leum company, which is the owner of three Greek refineries: in Thessaloniki 
(producing 83,000 barrels per day), Elefsis in Athens (100,000 barrels per day) 
and Aspropyrgos (140,000 barrels a day); these three refineries represent about 
two-thirds of Greece’s total refinery capacity65.
Surgutneftegaz also got rid of its refinery assets. In 2011, the company was 
forced to sell 21.22% of its shares in the Hungarian group MOL for about 
€1.88 billion (which it had bought in 2009 from the Austrian company ÖMV for 
€1.4 billion)66.
Zarubiezhneft was interested in investing in petrol stations, and in the con-
struction of an oil terminal in Omisalj, as well as in a pipeline to transport oil 
products between Slavonski Brod (on the border between Croatia and Bosnia & 
Herzegovina) and Omisalj, but in the end its planned investment there failed 
to amount to anything.
There is also doubt over the project to build a new oil terminal in Rotterdam 
proposed by the Shtandart TT B.V. consortium, whose majority shareholders are 
the Russian Summa Group and the Netherlands’ VTTI company (a subsidiary of 
the trading company Vitol S.a.). According to preliminary assumptions arising 
from the contract signed in October 2011 by Shtandart TT and representatives of 
the port of Rotterdam, the construction of the terminal (with a planned capacity 
of 50 million tonnes of crude oil and 12 million tonnes of oil products) should 
have begun in 2014, and the terminal itself handed over for use in 2016. The 
supposed advantage of this new terminal was that small Russian oil importers 
could buy the oil directly in Rotterdam, without the need to submit contracts in 
advance in the port of Primorsk67. In February 2014, however, VTTI withdrew 
from the consortium, which had the effect of suspending the project.
65 In 2001-2, Lukoil and Yukos were interested in acquiring shares in the company.
66 The transaction was the result of consistent efforts by the government of Viktor Orbán to 
increase control over the Hungarian national energy company MOL. In addition, the board 
of the Hungarian group, perceiving the transactions between Surgutneftegaz and ÖMV as 
a form of hostile takeover, has consistently refused to register the Russian company as a full 
partner. As a result, Surgutneftegaz has not had any representatives on the board, nor the 
right to vote at general shareholders’ meetings, which has de facto prevented the implemen-
tation of proprietary powers. See: Hungary will buy Russian shares in MOL, CES Analysis, 
25 May 2011, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-05-25/hungary-will-
buy-russian-shares-mol
67 Extended reach, Argus FSU, 28 October 2011, p. 2.
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Iv. THE pROSpECTS FOR THE RUSSIaN pRESENCE  
ON THE EU OIl maRkET
The prospects for the Russian position on the EU oil market depend on the 
changing conditions within the EU itself, on the evolution of the situation in 
the Russian oil sector, and the dynamics of the development of oil cooperation 
between Russia and China.
1. Unclear prospects for the development of the situation on the EU 
oil market
The dynamics of the processes taking place on the EU energy market includes 
phenomena which are both beneficial and negative for Russian energy compa-
nies, with the latter predominating.
A positive factor for Russia is the projected drop in production of the EU’s own oil, 
and the pessimistic forecasts for shale oil extraction in Europe. According to World 
Energy Outlook 2015, in the long term there will be a drop in crude oil production 
in Europe from 3.3 million barrels a day in 2014 (about 164.3 million tonnes per an-
num) to 2.2 million barrels per day in 2040 (109.5 million tonnes per annum). In 
turn, the decrease in profitability of European refineries (a trend which will appar-
ently be maintained in the coming years) will lead to a drop in their value, which 
in turn could be an incentive for Russian investors. Some Russian oil companies 
(Rosneft, Lukoil) have shown an interest in transforming refinery plants into dis-
tribution centres. These could attract wholesale batches of oil-derived products, 
which would create opportunities for Russian producers to make more profits.
Besides, many European refineries are suited for processing Russian Urals oil, 
and major changes in this area would require significant financial expenditure, 
which in terms of the current crisis on the oil processing market in Europe is 
unlikely.
On the other hand, potentially unfavourable processes for Russian compa-
nies on the EU market are accumulating, such as the drop in demand for crude 
oil in the EU; increased competition among exporters of crude oil and oil prod-
ucts on the EU market; the indirect effects of EU and American financial and 
technological sanctions; and uncertain forecasts for oil prices.
The projected further decline in oil consumption in the EU (connected with 
the maintenance of negative trends in the refining sector) could lead to further 
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restrictions on the sale of Russian crude oil on the EU market. According to the 
long-term forecasts in World Energy Outlook 2015, oil consumption in the EU 
will fall steadily from 527.6 million tonnes in 2014, to 443 million tonnes in 2025, 
to 328.6 million tonnes in 204068.
The expected rise of competition among exporters of crude oil could also 
be unfavourable for Russia. Thanks to the shale revolution in the US, and fall-
ing American crude oil imports from third countries (Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, 
Angola69), as well as the increase in competition on Asian markets, it is highly 
likely that additional quantities of crude oil will start to reach the EU market. 
In the short term, the most serious challenge to Russia may come from Sau-
di Arabia, which is interested in entering the markets of European countries 
traditionally dominated by oil imported from Russia. Russian concerns have 
been demonstrated in statements by representatives of Russia’s government 
and energy companies, such as the Energy Minister Alexander Novak and the 
chairman of Rosneft Igor Sechin70. Another long-term challenge could be com-
petition from Iran. It is true that before the introduction of the EU sanctions, 
Iranian oil did not constitute serious competition for Russia on the EU market 
(the share of Iranian crude in EU imports did not exceed 7% at that time, and so 
was much lower than that of Russian oil, running at an average of about 30%). 
In the medium term, however (after 2020), particularly with the involvement 
of Western multinationals in Iran’s upstream sector, Iran may be able to sub-
stantially increase both the production and export of crude oil. According to 
predictions, Iran is likely to increase its oil production from 2.7 million barrels 
a day in June 2015 to 4.7 million (World Energy Outlook 2015) or 4.4 million (Wood 
Mackenzie) barrels in 202571.
68 World Energy Outlook 2015, p. 119.
69 There is particular optimism about forecasts for the growth of oil production in Angola, 
for which the main outlet has traditionally been Asian countries, especially China. How-
ever, intensified competition for the Asian market with Russia and Saudi Arabia could lead 
to more crude from Angola becoming available on the EU market. More on the increasing 
competition among exporters of crude oil onto the EU market: Европейский рынок нефти: 
куча претендентов на место России, Нефтегазовая вертикаль, 17-18/2015, p. 72-79.
70 The chairman of Rosneft has even accused Saudi Arabia of dumping, the aim of which 
would be to increase the share of Saudi crude on the oil market, http://www.rbc.ru/politic
s/14/10/2015/561e30179a794738c0e8027a 
71 More about the potential consequences for Russia of Iran’s exit from international isola-
tion: W. Rodkiewicz, S. Kardaś, The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran, 
OSW Commentary, 4 Aug 2015. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commenta ry/ 
2015 -08-04/consequences-russia-nuclear-deal-iran
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Another important challenge for Russia may turn out to be an increase in im-
ports of oil products from other countries, which would raise the level of 
competition on the EU market. The United States is becoming Russia’s biggest 
competitor on this market, something which is particularly clear on the market 
for diesel. Russia’s share here, although still the largest, fell from 45% to 40% 
in the period 2002-12; at the same time the share of diesel coming from the US 
rose significantly (from 2% to 17%). This trend is likely to continue, and in the 
face of prospects for a rise in EU imports from countries in the Middle East and 
China, this strong competition would make it difficult for Russia to maintain 
its market share.
A very likely negative effect of an increase in imports of diesel fuel into the EU 
could be oversupply on the fuel market, which could make Russian exports 
less profitable in the long run. Besides, according to OECD projections, a slow 
but consistent rise in demand for gasoline (4.2% per annum) is noticeable in 
the EU, which in the long term could weaken the position of diesel. If Russia 
changes production to focus on diesel fuel, at the same time as investments to 
increase gasoline production remain low, this may lead to it once again reacting 
too slowly to dynamically evolving market trends. The forecasts for naphtha 
are also pessimistic. Russian exports have indeed continued to rise steadily, 
but signs of oversupply are already starting to appear on the EU market, which 
means it will be very hard for Russian companies not only to improve, but even 
to maintain their existing position72.
Some Russian oil companies find themselves in more difficulties due to the sanc-
tions imposed as a result of Russia’s aggression on Ukraine. American techno-
logical sanctions cover all the major Russian oil companies: Rosneft, Gazprom-
neft, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz. Similar technological sanctions have also been 
introduced by the EU, although there is no specific indication of which compa-
nies they cover. Financial sanctions (from both the United States and the EU) 
cover Rosneft, Gazpromneft and Transneft. The sanctions already introduced 
have not had any immediate negative consequences for Russian exports of oil 
or oil-derived products (commercial contracts are not covered by the sanctions 
mechanisms). However the sanctions’ indirect effects may be of significance, 
above all by making it more difficult for Russian oil companies to obtain the 
foreign capital and production technology they need for their ambitious na-
tionwide upstream projects. Yet the continuing political tension between the 
72 Нефтегазовая вертикаль, 2014-15, pp. 24-28.
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West and Russia does not prevent Russian companies from investing in the EU 
(an example of this is Rosneft’s new investments in German refinery assets). 
Nevertheless, it worsens the atmosphere for the presence of Russian capital on 
the EU market. This is confirmed by the words of Vagit Alekperov, the head of 
Lukoil, who admitted that the anti-Russian sanctions were one of the reasons 
for his company’s withdrawal from trading in liquid fuels in EU countries.
2. The domestic factor
The structural economic difficulties in Russia, which have been deepened 
by increased political tension in relations with the West, make it difficult 
to formulate predictions about the development prospects for the Russian 
oil sector.
First and foremost, the medium- and long-term prospects for the upstream sec-
tor are unclear. In 2014 the amount extracted produced came to 526 million 
tonnes, or about 21 million tonnes more than provided for in the General Scheme 
for the development of the oil sector to 202073. The uncertainty on the global 
oil market means that there are important differences among forecasts for oil 
production in Russia74. According to the preliminary assumptions of the Rus-
sian Energy Strategy to 2035, production in 2035 must remain at 515-535 million 
tonnes per annum, whereas according to the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
the figure must run at about 600 million tonnes per annum; according to OPEC 
it should be about 570 million tonnes, and according to the IEA the figure should 
be 495 million tonnes per annum. These differences in evaluations have links 
to both the uncertainty of demand for Russian crude oil on external markets, 
and to doubts as to whether Russian oil companies will be able to exploit new 
fields, which would require significant financial and technological investments.
The so-called tax manoeuvre (see chapter II, section 3) which came into force 
from 1 January 2015, may have two-fold implications for the export of Russian oil 
and oil-derived products onto the EU market. The new regulation was intended 
73 Генеральная схема развития нефтяной отрасли Российской Федерации до 2020 года, 
утвержденная приказом Минэнерго России от 6 июня 2011 г., № 212.
74 The result of this precarious situation is a series of delays in preparing strategic documents 
relating to the energy sector: the Energy Strategy for Russia to 2035 (which was to have been 
adopted in 2014, then the decision was put off until autumn 2015, and in December 2015 Rus-
sia’s energy minister Alexander Novak reported that the document would be accepted no 
earlier than spring 2016); and the General Scheme for the Development of the Oil Sector by 2030 
(which should have been adopted in autumn 2015, but was not).
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to bring measurable financial benefits to the oil companies: according to esti-
mates by the Moscow Oil & Gas Institute, a total of around US$2 billion at a price 
of $80 per barrel of crude; US$6 billion dollars at a price of $110 per barrel. How-
ever, the drastic fall in oil prices (from $113 in June 2014 to $30 in January 2016) 
may mean not just the absence of the expected profits, but even losses for the 
Russian producers. The same applies to oil products, where the production costs 
will rise significantly together with the introduction of the tax manoeuvre. 
The consequences of the tax manoeuvre may be particularly acute for Rosneft, 
the largest Russian exporter of crude oil and oil products. In addition, Rosneft 
found itself on the list of EU and US sanctions, making it difficult to acquire 
foreign capital, which among other things would have helped to cover the costs 
of upgrading its refineries (Rosneft’s refineries are some of the oldest in Russia). 
The sense of uncertainty is also reinforced by discussions on fiscal changes, 
including the introduction of the so-called tax on financial results (initially this 
was only applied to selected pilot projects).
Most forecasts indicate an increase in refineries output in Russia in the medi-
um-term (to 2020). According to the Platts agency, Russian production should 
rise: diesel from 70 million tonnes in 2010 up to 90 million tonnes by 2020; 
gasoline from 36 million tonnes in 2010 to 50 million tonnes in 2020. At the same 
time there will be a significant decline in the production of fuel oil (from 70 mil-
lion tonnes in 2010 to 25 million tonnes in 2020)75. However, it remains unclear 
whether, in conditions of the new fiscal regulations and the current economic 
difficulties, Russia’s refineries will continue to modernise at the same pace.
3. Today Europe, tomorrow asia?
In the medium term (to 2020), the negative trend in the export of crude oil 
to the EU observed over recent years could be stopped, and even slightly 
reversed. This is well illustrated by the figures on Russian oil exports for the 
year 2015 (an increase of 8% compared to the similar period in 2014), mainly 
due to the increase in the volume transmitted via the Druzhba pipeline (6.8%, 
in comparison with 2014). This mainly consists of a rise in the volume of crude 
oil sent to Germany via the Northern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, which 
is confirmed by the figures for the 2015 (16.5 million tonnes in 2014; 19.7 mil-
lion tonnes in 2015). This trend is also demonstrated by the actions taken by 
Russian companies, mainly Rosneft, such as the following: direct contracts 
75 Нефтегазовая вертикаль, 2014-15, pp. 24-28.
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agreed with European customers to ensure deliveries to refineries in Germany; 
investment in German oil assets; and the actions taken by the Russian gov-
ernment to maintain Russia’s position on the European market, including in 
Central Europe. One illustration of this is the Slovak-Russian 15-year intergov-
ernmental agreement, signed on 5 December 2014, providing for the supply of 
oil to Slovakia at 6 million tonnes per annum, and the same amount in transit 
via Slovakian territory.
There is a certain risk of more noticeable restrictions on supplies via the South-
ern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, associated with the possible further erosion 
of political and economic relations between Russia and Ukraine. It is true that 
even in March 2014, Nikolay Tokarev, the chairman of Transneft (the owner and 
operator of the Russian pipeline network), claimed that oil transit via Ukraine 
would not be affected, but then in May 2014, and then in August the same year, 
another representative of the government, Igor Dyomin, noted that Russia 
could redirect supplies via Druzhba’s Southern branch to its Northern branch, 
and also to the Russian Baltic ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk. Russia may use 
Ukraine’s domestic actions as a pretext, such as for example Kiev’s announce-
ment on 2 December 2014 that it would raise the transit fares on the Druzhba 
oil pipeline by 9%. However, it should be noted that redirecting supplies from 
Druzhba’s Southern branch to its Northern branch – if Russia wants to continue 
supplying the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – would not currently be 
possible; the appropriate infrastructure that would allow supplies to the Czech 
Republic of oil via the Northern branch of Druzhba is lacking. Any change in 
the strategies of certain companies that regularly raise the level of processing 
at their own refineries in Russia (such as Lukoil) could lead to a reduction in 
deliveries.
In the long term, however, we should expect a more significant drop in 
supplies of crude oil to the EU. This is principally confirmed by forecasts from 
global institutions analysing the energy markets, which speak of declining de-
mand for crude oil in the EU’s member states. The World Energy Outlook 2015 
report indicates that during the period 2014-2040, consumption in the EU is 
expected to fall by almost 40% (from 10.6 to 6.6 million barrels per day)76. The 
drop in the European share of total Russian oil exports was forecast in the plan 
for the new Energy Strategy for Russia to 2035, originally published in January 
2014: exports to Europe (both the EU and other European countries) were not 
76 World Energy Outlook 2015, p. 119.
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to exceed 60%, and those to Asia were to rise to 32%. The revised version of the 
draft strategy, published in September 2015, calls for an increase of 1.8-2.2 times 
in the volume of Russian crude oil exports to Asian countries, which would 
mean Asia’s share of Russian crude oil exports would reach a level of 43-45%77.
Much more pessimistic scenarios for Russian oil exports, especially in relation 
to the European markets, have been presented by the experts of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences. According to their forecasts of energy development for 
Russia and the world until 2040 (published in 2014), Russian crude oil export 
to the EU will drop from 160 million tonnes in 2015 to 83 million tonnes in 2040, 
which will particularly affect oil supplies by sea (estimated at just 35-40 million 
tonnes in 2040)78. A negative long-term trend in the crude oil market is also in-
dicated by the representatives of the Russian oil companies, including Nikolay 
Tokarev, the CEO of Transneft79.
It is thus very likely that shrinking crude oil supplies to the EU will be 
compensated for by a steady increase in exports to asian countries, main-
ly China. Firstly, this will arise from the need to meet existing commitments, 
mainly those undertaken by the state-owned group Rosneft. These include the 
contract concluded by Rosneft and the CNPC in June 2013, to supply 365 million 
tonnes of oil over 25 years, providing for regular increases in supply: 15.8 mil-
lion tonnes in 2013, 17.2 million tonnes in 2014, 20 million tonnes in the period 
2015-17, and 30 million tonnes per annum in the period 2018-203080; the memo-
randum of understanding with Sinopec from 2013, providing for the signing of 
a contract to supply 100 million tonnes of oil in 10 years81; and a ten-year contract 
with the Indian company Essar, signed on 8 July 2015, to supply 10 million tonnes 
77 Энергетическая стратегия России на период до 2035 года (проект), version published 
in January 2014: http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/iblock/621/621d81f0fb5a11919f912bfaf
b3248d6.pdf; for the version from September 2015, see http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/
iblock/43e/proekt-energeticheskoy-strategii-rossii-na-period-do-2035.pdf
78 Прогноз развития энергетики мира и России до 2040 года, p. 138-139, http://www.eriras.
ru/files/forecast_2040.pdf (30 April 2015).
79 Меньше нефти на экспорт, http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2014/01/14/
menshe-nefti-na-eksport (15 January 2015).
80 «Роснефть» и CNPC подписали соглашения о поставках нефти, http://www.rosneft.ru/
news/pressrelease/210620139.html (21 June 2013).
81 «Роснефть» и Sinopec согласовали Меморандум в отношении заключения экспортного 
контракта на условиях предоплаты, http://www.rosneft.ru/news/pressrelease/221020132.
html (22 October 2013).
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of oil per annum82. Secondly, the long-term forecasts of crude oil consumption in 
Asia are very beneficial for exporters. In the period 2013-2040 demand for crude 
oil is projected to rise by more than 70% (up to 1.6678 billion tonnes in 2040), and 
in China alone by around 60% (up to 781.6 million tonnes in 2040). Taking into 
account the anticipated fall in Asian countries’ domestic production, from 393.3 
million tonnes in 2013 to 288.7 million tonnes in 2040 (including China, from 
214.1 million tonnes to 169.3 million tonnes), Asia’s dynamically rising demand 
will mainly be covered by imported oil (details in table 18).
Table 18. Forecasts of production and consumption of crude oil in Asia 
(million tonnes)
    2013 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
Japan
Consumption 219 184.2 164.3 149.4 139.4 129.4
Domestic production - - - - - -
China 
Consumption 487.9 597.4 692 751.7 776.6 781.6
Domestic production 214.1 219.1 204.1 189.2 179.3 169.3
Total 
Asia
Consumption 980.7 1189.8 1349.2 1493.5 1593.1 1667.8
Domestic production 393.3 378.4 343.5 318.6 303.7 288.7
Author’s own calculations, based on data published in World Energy Outlook 2014.
On its way to implementing these ambitious plans, Russia will have to 
confront several major challenges. These include the need to expand its 
infrastructure, to maintain the growth rate of oil production in the east-
ern part of the country, and to compete with other countries exporting 
oil onto asian markets.
Regarding the infrastructure used to export oil onto the asian markets, 
Russian companies can currently transmit crude oil via the Eastern Siberia-
Pacific Ocean pipelines: ESPO-1 (Taishet-Skovorodino; original capacity 50 mil-
lion tonnes) and ESPO-2 (Skovorodino-Kozmino; original capacity 30 million 
tonnes). In December 2014, the chairman of Transneft reported that the ESPO’s 
82 The agreement also provides for Rosneft to acquire a 49% stake in the Indian Wadinar 
refinery (capacity of 20 million tonnes). ‘«Роснефть» и Essar расширяют комплексное 
сотрудничество’, http://rosneft.ru/news/pressrelease/08072015.html (8 July 2015).
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capacity along first section would be expanded from 50 to 58 million tonnes. The 
existing capacity is insufficient in the context of the above-mentioned plans 
(mainly by Rosneft) to increase crude oil exports. In 2015 the port of Kozmino 
reached its maximum possible export capacity83; meanwhile, it will not be pos-
sible to increase oil transit to China via a branch of the ESPO pipeline (Skovo-
rodino-Mohe), due to delays in the construction work on the Chinese side84.
In accordance with the earlier provisions, there is a plan to increase the capacity 
of the existing infrastructure by 2020: that of the Taishet-Skovorodino section 
to 80 million tonnes, and that of the Skovorodino-Kozmino section to 50 million 
tonnes. The cost of the project was estimated at 172 billion roubles (about US$3 
billion) in February 2014. It is true that the decline in oil prices and the limited 
ability to raise external capital due to the sanctions could to a certain extent 
hinder the implementation of the investment plans; however, the fact that en-
ergy cooperation with China is a high priority for Russia, and has the political 
support of Vladimir Putin, allows us to assume that any financial difficulties 
will be overcome, and that the oil infrastructure projects will be carried out.
It will be a major challenge to maintain the growth in the rate of oil pro-
duction in the eastern part of Russia, in conditions of low oil prices. The 
initial plan in the Energy Strategy for Russia to 2035, published in January 2015, did 
provide for an increase in the participation of Eastern Siberia and the Far East 
in oil production in Russia, from 7% in 2010 to 20% in 2035 (that is, from 35 mil-
lion tonnes per annum to 94-106 million tonnes per annum). These forecasts, 
however, were made at a time when the price of a barrel of crude was about 
$106 (January 2014). In the beginning of 2016 the price of barrel of oil fell below 
$30, which makes the long-term forecasts of a rise in production, including the 
exploitation of new fields in the eastern part of Russia, highly unrealistic.
83 The port’s current capacity is about 30 million tonnes. Rosneft will be forced to take up ne-
gotiations on the acquisition of additional export quotas granted by Transneft to Lukoil and 
Surgutneftegaz (1.4 million and 500,000 tonnes). Роснефти для поставок в Китай нужен 
весь обьем ВСТО, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2655227 (28 January 2015).
84 This is the version presented by Russia, including the CEO of Transneft, Nikolai Tokariev. 
In accordance with the agreements with the CNPC, Rosneft is obliged to increase its 2015 ex-
ports to China by 5 million tonnes. The original plan was to increase the shipment of oil via 
the Skovorodino-Mohe pipeline (a branch of the ESPO pipeline). However, a real increase 
in supply will not be possible in 2015 due to uncompleted work on the Chinese side. Any 
increase in deliveries will thus only be possible via the port of Kozmino.
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The Strategy’s assumptions show that Western Siberia will remain the main 
region of oil production. Although the Western Siberian fields could potentially 
be a source of growth in exports to Asian markets, this would require a signifi-
cant investment in pipeline infrastructure, which combined with the cost of 
transmitting the oil from West to East, would render such a move uneconomic.
Another challenge may be the need for Russia to compete with other oil- 
-exporting countries on asian markets. It is true that by 2015 Russia had 
moved ahead of the other countries exporting oil to China, even leaving Saudi 
Arabia (hitherto the Chinese market’s main supplier) behind in the rankings; 
in the long term, however, the situation could change. Falling exports onto the 
American market and a drop in supplies to the shrinking European market 
could encourage suppliers from Africa or the Middle East to increase their oil 
sales to Asian markets. Competition for customers in Asia could lead to a reduc-
tion in prices, which may reduce the profitability of Russian exports.
as for exports of oil products, quantitative falls in supply drops are fore-
cast for the EU market, both in the medium and long term, while the key 
importance of the European market in total exports of oil products con-
tinues.
According to the Forecast of energy development for Russia and the world to 2040, 
exports of oil products to the EU will fall from 114.2 million tonnes in 2014 to 84 
million tonnes in 2020 and 64 million tonnes in 204085. The decline of oil prod-
uct export to Europe will not be replaced by oil products export to Asia. This is 
illustrated by the data for the period 2011-14 indicating the systematic decline 
in transit via Russia’s Far East ports (from 9.4 million tonnes in 2011 to around 
6.7 million tonnes in 2014). In particular, this applies to fuel oil (a drop of 46%, 
to 1.5 million tonnes per annum); meanwhile exports of diesel have risen, albeit 
slightly (an increase in 2014 of about 18.5%, to 3.7 million tonnes per annum). 
This negative trend in oil products export to Asia is set to continue in the long 
term: 4 million tonnes in 2020, 2 million tonnes in 204086.
85 ‘Прогноз развития энергетики мира и России до 2040 года’, p. 139, http://www.eriras.ru/
files/forecast_2040.pdf (30 April 2015).
86 Ibid.
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Table 19. Russian exports of oil products via ports in the far east of Russia in 
the period 2011-14 (million tonnes)
2011 2012 2013 2014
Nakhodka 5.7 5.35 5.21 5.44
Slavianka 1.05 0.95 0.95 0.25
vanino 2.65 2.37 1.98 1.04
Total 9.4 8.67 8.14 6.73
Author’s own calculations, based on data published by the FSU Argus.
***
This analysis of the Russian presence on the EU oil market during the period 
2011-15 shows that this is the beginning of a transitional period, which in the 
long term will lead to a significant limitation of the role of the EU market in Rus-
sian oil exports, arising mainly from changes in market conditions in the EU. 
This means that in the current environment, Russian companies will operate on 
the basis that they will continue to own what they already have, and will boost 
their presence on Asian markets, the importance of which will rise steadily. The 
scale of this increase, however, will depend on whether Russia can maintain the 
momentum of growth in the volume of crude oil it exports onto Asian markets; 
this may be difficult, in terms of the current internal and external challenges, 
in particular in the context of a downturn in the world market price of oil. It is 
therefore possible that instead of the importance of European and Asian exports 
of Russian oil becoming equal, as predicted by some, there will on the one hand 
be a fall in exports to Europe, in parallel with a regular, but not as significant, 
rise in deliveries to Asia on the other.
However, taking into account the negative prospects for the development of the 
situation on Russia’s traditional European market for oil, reorienting exports to 
Asia is becoming more and more an expression not so much of a political choice 
(although the political & economic pivot to the East announced by the Kremlin 
is important in this respect), as of an economic necessity.
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